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The Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) is a nation characterized by severe armed conflict. 
The first phase of conflict began in 1996, resulting in the overthrow of Mobutu in 1997 by 
Laurent Kabila. While the second phase of conflict began when Rwandans invaded the DRC 
and backed new rebellion forces against Kabila. Kabila then turned to members of the 
Southern African Development Community (SADC) for support. Subsequently, in August 
1998, SADC intervened for the very first time in the DRC and its intervention resulted in the 
signing of the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement in July 1999. A month later the United Nations 
Security Council (UNSC) established the United Nations Organization Mission in the 
Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUC) by its resolution 1258. MONUC’s initial mandate 
was to observe the ceasefire; ensure the disengagement of all forces; and maintain close 
liaison with all parties to the Ceasefire Agreement. However, through a series of subsequent 
resolutions, the UNSC expended MONUC’s area of responsibility to include supervising 
implementation of the agreement, and performing multiple additional tasks.  
 
On 1 July 2010, UNSC by its Resolution 1925 renamed MONUC the United Nations 
organization stabilization mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO). 
MONUSCO was mandated among other things to protect civilians and support the DRC 
government in its stabilization and peace consolidation effects. Nevertheless, the DRC 
continues to be mired in intractable conflicts. The security situation remains extremely 
volatile and peace remains elusive. While the western part of the country enjoys relative 
calm, the eastern regions consistently experience high insecurity and repeated incidences of 
violence. Therefore, this study examines the role of peacekeeping bodies’ in Africa.   In 
particular, the study analyses the role of MONUSCO and SADC in the DRC conflict. It 
examines the socio-economic and political conditions in the DRC prior to their arrival. The 
study identifies and explains the factors that gave rise to their deployment. It evaluates their 
successes and failures as per their mandates and responsibilities towards combating conflict 
in the DRC. The analysis of both peacekeeping bodies’ highlights new insights into 
peacekeeping partnerships between local and international peacekeeping bodies’ and the 
challenges and constraints they endure in conflict ridden areas. The study concludes by 




The study argues that in situations of conflicts in which regional and international bodies’ 
such as SADC and the UN intervene in order to ensure peace, these bodies’ need to make 
clear as well as develop their operational doctrines and not allow differences and divisions to 
hinder their conflict resolution initiatives in order to help facilitate more lasting peace and 
security. It argues that partnerships between local and international peacekeeping bodies’ are 
vital for the success of peacekeeping operations and combating African conflicts. These 
bodies may have different roles but they play an equally important, sometimes mutually re-
enforcing role in peacekeeping and conflict resolutions in countries such as the DRC. The 
study concludes that there is a need for solid and practical relationships between local and 
international bodies’ in order to be effective in curbing both intrastate and interstate conflict 
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INTRODUCTION AND CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 
 
1.1 Background and purpose of study 
Peacekeeping is a concept that developed during the Cold War era as a means to authorize 
neutral military personnel to either physically separate conflicting parties or monitor a peace 
agreement that is supervised or supported by the United Nations (UN). These neutral military 
personnel were deployed in civil wars and wars between states as authorized by the UN, in 
consensus with the states or belligerents. However, the post-Cold War era saw neutral armed 
forces being sent to lesser inter-state conflicts as civil wars grew to dominate UN attention 
(Mays, 2012: 167). In similar vein, Fortna (2004) states that in the post-Cold War era, the 
international community and the UN have shifted further than monitoring the ceasefire of 
interstates, to monitoring and administering various aspects of intrastate peace processes 
(Fortna, 2004: 269).  
 
Majinge (2010) argues that the concept of peacekeeping is made up of two major principles, 
namely the need to stop armed conflict for the creation of an atmosphere that is favorable for 
negotiations and the need to prevent the sudden occurrence of armed conflict after an 
agreement to stop fighting (Majinge, 2010: 465-466). In line with Majinge’s principles, Juma 
(2009) argues that peacekeeping does not bring about an agreement between conflicting 
parties. But, it always comes in after an agreement has been reached, to assist its 
implementation. However, this can only be possible if and when all parties to the conflict 
have agreed to momentarily stop fighting, and allow intervention by a neutral third party. It 
also creates an atmosphere that is conducive for the implementation of other terms of the 
agreement. “In the early days, it was anticipated that these objectives could be achieved 
without the use of force” (Juma, 2009: 6).  
 
However, recent conflicts have witnessed more instances where UN peacekeepers are given 
authority to use force. Therefore, even though the UN peacekeeping strategy in civil wars has 
always been negotiated settlements and to persuade conflicting parties that “the use of force 
to resolve dispute will not succeed”, modern-day peacekeeping has become more than just 
the stabilisation of a conflict situation (Juma, 2009: 6).  According to Okumu and Jaye (2010) 
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peacekeeping has changed so much over the years, to an extent that it now involves a variety 
of actors. Therefore, rights and responsibilities of peacekeeping in African conflicts are no 
longer limited to the UN. For instance, contemporary peacekeeping operations involve local 
actors and local ownership and partnerships to a very large extent. With earliest examples 
being the 1990 intervention in Liberia by the Economic Community of Western African 
States (ECOWAS) and the establishment of a African Union (AU) peacekeeping force in 
2003 (Okumu and Jaye, 2010: 11). 
 
ECOWAS intervened in Liberia by deploying its Ceasefire Monitoring Group (ECOMOG). 
The Monitoring Group was deployed in Liberia as a typical traditional peacekeeping mission. 
Its operation began on August 24, 1990, at the Liberian capital Monrovia, comprising of 3000 
West African troops. ECOMOG was mandated to evaluate the ECOWAS Standing Mediation 
Committee (SMC) in administering and guaranteeing stern compliance to the requirements of 
the agreement to stop fighting by belligerent parties throughout Liberia (Tuck, 2000: 2). In 
the course of ECOMOG deployment, the mission became involved in a variety of operations 
that ranged from “protection of humanitarian aid; disarming of factions; cantonment; 
mediation; and peace enforcement” (Tuck, 2000: 2). However, it was through peace 
enforcement that ECOMOG was then able to establish a measure of stability that continued 
for just over two years, with the Monitoring Group in charge of Monrovia and the National 
Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPF) controlling most of the rest of the country (Tuck, 2000: 7).  
 
The AU intervened in Burundi by deploying the organizations Mission in Burundi (AMIB).  
AMIB was authorized amongst other things to “act as liaison between the parties; monitor 
and verify the implementation of the ceasefire agreement; and to facilitate and provide 
technical assistance to disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) processes” 
(Boshoff and Francis, 2003: 41). According to Sifolo (2010: 137) AMIB’s deployment 
played a significant role in resolving tension in Burundi and establishing a favourable 
atmosphere for sustainable political resolution. AMIB created conditions that ensured the 
return of immigrants and internally displaced persons (IDPs), and prevented violent conflict 
through engaging in peacebuilding to lay foundations for reconciliation and reconstruction. 
Therefore, when the mission concluded its operation it had successfully created comparative 
peace to most of the country’s provinces, except for Bujumbura’s outer area which was faced 
with a rebellion by a rebel movement by the name National Forces of Liberation (FNL) 
(Murithi, 2008: 75). 
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There are a number of peacekeeping bodies’ that have intervened and are still intervening in 
African conflicts ever since the beginning of the post-Cold War era. These peacekeeping 
bodies’ have played different roles. They have had their fair share of successes and failures, 
depending on their mandates and responsibilities, amongst other contributing factors. Fortna 
(2004) notes that researchers and experts of peacekeeping have deliberated on the merit of 
these more “robust” and multidimensional arrangements of peacekeeping and peace 
enforcement missions, and including their effectiveness in conflict ridden areas. But, such 
deliberations are hindered by the lack of thorough examination of the effectiveness of 
intervention by these bodies’. Therefore, there is no consensus whether they really resolve 
conflicts and bring about peace or not (Fortna, 2004: 269). 
 
In light of the above note this study looks at peacekeeping in the Democratic Republic of 
Congo (DRC). It analyzes the role of the UN Organization Stabilization Mission in the DRC 
(MONUSCO) and the Southern African Development Community (SADC) in the DRC 
conflict. 
 
The DRC is a nation characterized by two phases of severe armed conflict. The first phase of 
conflict began in 1996, resulting in the overthrow of the then President Mobutu Sese Seko in 
1997 by Laurent Kabila (Yabadi, 2011:1). While the second phase of conflict began when 
Rwandans and Ugandans invaded the DRC and backed a new rebellion against Kabila 
(Cilliers and Malan, 2001: 7). Kabila then turned to members of SADC for support and 
gained backing from Angola, Namibia and Zimbabwe. Subsequently, on 10 July, 1999, the 
Lusaka peace accord was signed following the international community’s escalating pressure 
for a peaceful settlement of the conflict. However, the agreement was only signed by the six 
state parties, since the two main rebel movements, namely the Congolese Rally for 
Democracy (RCD) and the Movement for the Liberation of Congo (MLC) both refused to 
sign (Koko, 2007: 33).  
 
Signatories to the ceasefire agreement then requested UN presence to ensure implementation 
of the agreement, and in August 1999, 90 liaison officers and non-combatant personnel were 
sent to the DRC. Subsequently, the UN Security Council (UNSC) formed the UN 
Organization Mission in the DRC (MONUC) through its resolution 1279 of 30 November, 
1999 (Zeebroek, 2008: 1). Amongst other responsibilities, MONUC was mandated “to plan 
for the observation of the ceasefire and disengagement forces, and to maintain liaison with all 
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parties to the ceasefire agreement” (UNSC Resolution 1279, 1999: 3). Since then, the UN 
Security Council extended MONUC’s mandate and expanded its size in an effort to stabilize 
eastern DRC. The extension saw the mandate evolve to encompass the safety of non-
combatants as first priority in an effort to deal with widespread violence against civilians 
(Holt and Taylor, 2009: 241). 
 
The UN Security Council by resolution 1925 of 28 May 2010 decide that, as from 1 July 
2010, MONUC would be renamed to MONUSCO. Amongst other things the mission was 
authorized “to ensure the effective protection of civilians and support the government of 
DRC in its stabilization and peace consolidation effects” (UNSC Resolution 1925, 2010: 4-
5). However, according to a report by the UN Children’s Fund (UNICEF), the DRC’s 
security situation remains awfully unstable. Conflict with multiple armed actors from across 
the region continues to aggravate mass displacements (UNICEF, 2014).  
 
Therefore, this study’s objective is to examine the role played by peacekeeping bodies’ in 
Africa.   In particular, the study will examine the role of MONUSCO and SADC in resolving 
conflict and peacekeeping in the DRC. It will examine their successes and failures as per their 
mandates and responsibilities towards combating conflict in the DRC. The examination of 
both peacekeeping bodies’ will highlight new insights into peacekeeping partnerships 
between local and international peacekeeping bodies, challenges and constraints they endure 
in conflict ridden areas. It will also highlight both successes and failures of peacekeeping 
bodies’ as opposed to selection bias by both opponents and proponents of peacekeeping, who 
tend to respectively point out only the failures or the successes of peacekeeping.   
 
1.2 Statement of problem 
The UN Security Council played a significant part by deploying peacekeeping missions in the 
DRC. Equally so, SADC has done a great deal by intervening in the DRC conflict since 1998. 
However, the DRC is continuously hindered by intractable conflicts. In spite of MONUSCO 
deployment and SADC intervention there is still ongoing conflict and violence in the DRC. 
Eastern DRC constantly experiences deepening insecurity and recurrent occurrences of 
violence. 
 
Even though MONUSCO deployed in the DRC is the largest and most costly peacekeeping 
mission ever deployed by the UN Security Council in the history of UN missions, it has not 
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been able to curb the conflict in the DRC. In spite of its mandate to protect civilians, 
humanitarian workers and human rights protectors in imminent danger of physical violence 
and supporting the DRC government in its stabilization and peace consolidation efforts, 
peace in the country is still elusive. SADC as a local peacekeeping body which is supposed to 
have better knowledge of the origins of the conflict and parties to the conflict in their member 
state has equally not been able to be an “African solution to an African problem”. Both 
MONUSCO and SADC struggle to maintain peace and security in the country. 
 
Furthermore, if the conflict is not resolved it would then mean that both MONUSCO and 
SADC have failed to successfully implement their mandates and responsibilities towards 
combating conflict and creating a peaceful DRC. Therefore, this would serve as an addition 
to selection bias by opponents of peacekeeping who tend to focus solely on failures of 
peacekeeping without acknowledging any of its successes. 
 
1.3 Literature survey 
According to Dawson (2004) peacekeeping is a concept that is difficult to explain, as it may 
mean different things to different users. Therefore, owing to the variety of missions being 
defined, and the understanding and accepted meaning of the word, “peacekeeping” is used to 
cover an extensive variety of missions that frequently consist of peacebuilding and diplomatic 
peacemaking components. But most importantly, the core meaning of peacekeeping is the 
facilitation of a transition from a state of war to a state of ceasefire. Behr (2011: 40) supports 
Dawson’s view as she notes that peacekeeping is a term commonly used to define a variety of 
interventions. “Peacekeeping operations differ according to the intervening parties, the 
reasons for intervention, the methods used to intervene and whether they are initiated on a 
unilateral or bilateral fashion” (Behr, 2011: 40). 
  
The International Peace Academy cited in Punga (2011: 5) refers to peacekeeping as “the 
prevention, containment, moderation and termination of hostilities between or within states, 
through the medium of a peaceful third party intervention organized and directed 
internationally, using a multinational forces of soldiers, police and civilians to restore and 
maintain peace”. According to Onumajuru (2005) the idea of peacekeeping is the intervention 
of an impartial international force in a conflict situation in order to stablish a barrier between 
belligerent parties. Therefore, peacekeeping missions are basically applied means established 
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by the UN to control as well as regulate armed hostilities and enable their resolution by 
pacific means (Onumajuru, 2005: 15).  
 
In light of the above accounts, it can be concluded that peacekeeping is a passage to conflict 
resolution. Such is also evident in the roles played by the four types of peacekeeping 
missions, namely observer missions, traditional peacekeeping, multidimensional 
peacekeeping and peace enforcement.  
 
Fortna (2004: 270) claims that observer missions are usually small in size and comprise 
defenseless observers. Traditional peacekeeping missions are slightly bigger and consist of 
lightly equipped armed units, frequently in addition to observers. They are normally 
mandated to utilize force, but only in self-defense. Multidimensional peacekeeping missions 
enhance the latter with big non-combatant units to observe elections and human rights, train 
or monitor police and from time to time temporarily govern the state. Peace enforcement 
missions are generally the larger and better armed of all four missions, as they are authorized 
to forcefully enforce peace. Fortna (2004: 270) also claims that the first three missions are 
founded on the agreement of belligerents and mandated by Chapter VI of the UN Charter. 
Whereas the forth mission does not require consent and is authorized by Chapter VII. 
  
According to Fortna and Howard (2008) literature on peacekeeping has come in three waves. 
The first wave was throughout the period before the post-Cold War, concentrating primarily 
on peacekeeping in interstate conflicts. The second wave was motivated by the development 
of peacekeeping during early ages of the post-Cold War era. It reflects disappointment and 
concentrates mainly on failure and dysfunction, even though there are substantial cases of 
success. The third and current wave equally shows the growth of peacekeeping, however it 
now has to do with systematic and methodologically thorough examinations of simple 
empirical questions on the outcomes of peacekeeping as well as its bases. Contemporary 
empirical examinations have shown the efficiency of peacekeeping in upholding peace; 
however associated enquiries continue regarding “the use of force, transitional 
administrations, which organizations most effectively keep peace, perspectives of the 
“peacekept”, and effects on democratization” (Fortna and Howard, 2008: 283). 
 
Paris (2003) argues that for the greater part of the Cold War era, the study of peacekeeping 
was something that was isolated in the field of International Relations (IR). However, it was 
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driven out of obscurity and into the mainstream of International Relations scholarship by a 
series of new operations that were introduced towards final years of the Cold War and into 
the early post-Cold War era in countries such as Bosnia, Somalia, Cambodia, Namibia, etc. 
Much of the early post-Cold War writing on peacekeeping included single case studies that 
were critiqued for lacking theoretical foundation. Since then, the study of peacekeeping has 
been motivated in part by the aim of ascertaining and clarifying conditions that make certain 
peacekeeping operations more effective than others as it has developed into a more clearly 
theoretical undertaking (Paris, 2003: 441-442).  
 
Dawson (2004: 1) asserts that peacekeeping rests on three political principles, it calls for 
peacekeepers to uphold consent by the concerned state(s) and belligerents; act impartially; 
and non-violently. In line with these principles Article 2 (7) of the UN Charter forbids 
interference in internal affairs of a member state, outside of Chapter VII enforcement 
measures (UN Charter, 1945: 3). As a result, a UN peacekeeping operation can only 
intervene in internal affairs of a state that has approved the intervention and the entire 
peacekeeping operations. Also, if the UN wants to maintain peace, it has to be objective in its 
peacekeeping operations. It should refrain from using any form of force as it would be 
extremely difficult for the UN to still be considered as a neutral body if it engages in coercive 
force. Thus, it is for that reason that UN peacekeepers use of force is only limited to self-
defense (Hilmarsdottir, 2012: 19). 
 
Dawson (2004) claims that these principles have remained relevant ever since they emerged 
during the Cold War. Peacekeeping usually involves monitoring of force separations or 
ceasefires by military forces under UN command. With a few exceptions, they are positioned 
between belligerents who have agreed to stop fighting and have accepted the presence of the 
UN force. Peacekeepers are deployed to stabilize hotspots, defuse tensions, and help resolve 
disputes, whilst they risk being drawn into the conflict if they do not observe the three 
principles (Dawson, 2004: 1). In line with Dawson’s claim Van Der Lijn (2009: 3) argues 
that “an operation has the best chance for success if the parties have underlined their genuine 
desire for peace with a formal peace agreement”. Therefore, making consent an essential 
peacekeeping principle since a formal peace agreement is an official consent to end violent 
conflict by belligerent parties. Hence, in the absence of consent an operation can only 
implement its mandate by military force and if that becomes the case it is no longer regarded 
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impartial. It subsequently loses its peacekeeping character, as it would have crossed the line 
into peace enforcement (Van Der Lijn, 2009: 3-4).  
 
Against this backdrop, it is important to examine the role of peacekeeping bodies’ in Africa. 
Therefore, in order to examine the research problem this study will pose and address the 
following research questions: 
 
 What were the DRC’s socio-economic and political conditions prior to the arrival of 
MONUSCO and SADC? 
 What factors facilitated the deployment of MONUSCO and SADC to the DRC? 
 What were the successes and failures of MONUSCO and SADC in the DRC conflict? 
 What are the lessons learned from the research to contribute to policy making and 
initiatives? 
 
1.4 Aims and objectives of the study 
The aim of this study is to analyze the role of MONUSCO and SADC in the DRC; and its 
objectives are as follows: 
 
 To examine the DRC’s socio-economic and political conditions prior to the arrival of 
MONUSCO and SADC. 
 To identify and explain the factors that gave rise to MONUSCO and SADC 
deployment in the DRC. 
 To evaluate the successes and failures of MONUSCO and SADC in the DRC conflict. 
 To establish lessons learned from the research to contribute to policy making and 
initiatives. 
 
1.5 Theoretical Framework 
This study will adopt the third-party peacekeeping approach. Mullenbach (2013) defines 
third-party peacekeeping as the deployment of military or civilian personnel by one or more 
third-party states into a conflict or post-conflict situation. Among other things deployment is 
for maintaining law and order, monitoring a ceasefire agreement, verifying the disarmament, 
demobilization, and disengagement of combatants. Fortna (2003) states that “one of the most 
significant developments in the management of international disputes since the end of the 
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Second World War has been third-party peacekeeping”. Another theory utilized in this study 
is the conflict resolution theory. Wani (2011) argues that conflict resolution has immense 
importance and relevance in present times, as social, economic, political, ethnic and other 
types of conflicts are prevalent. Conflict resolution as a mechanism of peace building, 
peacemaking and peacekeeping includes only peaceful methods and techniques for the 
maintenance of peace and security and to protect the succeeding generations from the scourge 
of war (Wani, 2011: 104). Therefore, Wani’s arguments are relevant for this study as there is 
great primacy and relevance of conflict resolution mechanisms to be adopted by both 
MONUSCO and SADC for the prevention of conflict in the DRC. 
 
1.6 Research methodology  
Research methodology refers to the various methods, techniques and procedures that are 
employed during the implementation of a research project. Methodology in the social 
sciences requires choosing the most appropriate theories, techniques and explaining models 
or paradigms which present a clear understanding of a question and phenomenon. The 
objective is to provide an analytical explanation of facts, realities or a situation that has been 
initially considered as a problem requiring resolution or raising questions that necessitates 
answers (Babbie and Mouton, 2001). 
 
In the field of social sciences, two research methodologies are conventionally used when 
conducting research, namely qualitative and quantitative. Dependent on the type of study, the 
researcher may use either or both of these methods, known as mixed method. Therefore, this 
study uses a qualitative approach to investigate and interpret the role of MONUSCO and 
SADC in peacekeeping in the DRC. Denzin and Lincoln (1994) argue that qualitative 
research entails interpretation of occurrences in their natural settings in order to make sense 
of “collecting information about personal experiences, introspection, life story, interviews, 
observations, historical interactions and visual text which are significant moments and 
meaningful in people’s lives”. 
 
Merriam (2009) notes that “there is almost no consistency across writers in how (the 
philosophical) aspect of the qualitative research is discussed” (Merriam, 2009: 8). She also 
adds that, in true qualitative fashion, each writer makes sense of the field in a personal, 
socially constructed way (Ibid). The qualitative researcher often is the instrument, relying on 
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his or her skills to receive information in natural contexts and uncover its meaning by 
descriptive, exploratory, or explanatory procedures. 
 
According to Liebscher (1998) “qualitative methods are appropriate when the phenomena 
under study are complex, are social in nature, and do not lend themselves to quantification” 
(Liebscher, 1998: 669). On that same note Wiersma (1995) states that the strengths of the 
qualitative method include the fact that it enables researchers to explore complex occurrences 
in a holistic manner, it decreases the chances of researchers forcing their presumptions or 
prejudices, and conclusions are derived from the data (Wiersma, 1995: 212). Therefore, in 
this study qualitative research is most suitable as it will allow the researcher to holistically 
examine the role of MONUSCO and SADC without any selective bias and base its 
conclusions purely on the data analysed in the study. 
 
1.6.1 Data collection  
Data was collected through a desktop research method, which involved collecting and 
examining a variety of existing sources. The researcher focused on material related to the 
research questions and collected data based on both primary and secondary sources. 
According to Sekaran and Bougie (2010) a primary source is a document or physical object 
which was written or created during the time under study. Therefore, primary sources will 
provide more recent perspectives and developments of the DRC peace process in as far as 
both MONUSCO and SADC are concerned. Amongst other primary sources used by this 
study are public reports on conflict resolutions and peacekeeping in the DRC produced by 
both the UN and SADC which assisted in determining the role of MONUSCO and SADC in 
the DRC conflict.  
 
Secondary sources are used to complement primary sources. They are utilized to get insight 
on where the conflict in the DRC began, where it is today and what role MONUSCO and 
SADC have played along the way. The main sources of secondary data for this study are in 
the form of scholarly works on conflict resolution and peacekeeping, they comprised books, 
journals, newspapers, internet sources and other documents of historical, political and 






1.6.2 Data analysis 
To analyze both the primary and secondary data; the study utilized the content analysis 
method of analysing data. According to Berelson (1952) utilization of documents frequently 
involves a specialized analytic approach known as content analysis. Sources for content 
analysis comprise any form of communication that is usually written, in the form of 
textbooks, novels, newspapers, etc. It is understood more amply to be a means for describing 
and interpreting the artefacts of a society or social group (Marshall and Rossman, 1995). The 
significance of content analysis is that it allows researchers to analyse huge amounts of data 
in an orderly manner. It also enables them to ascertain and define the focus of individual, 
group, institutional or social attention (Weber, 1990).  
 
Hsieh and Shannon (2005: 1277) state that content analysis constitutes a very important part 
of the qualitative research approach and is used to interpret meaning from the context of the 
data text. Thus, the use of this approach was aimed to simplify and to clearly explain 
information specific to the study. It also allowed interpretations that can be validated through 
the use of other data collection methods. 
 
1.7 Problems/Limitations 
This study’s limitations are a result of insufficient reference materials and the challenge of 
retrieving sources on SADC peacekeeping in the DRC, as available material is mainly on 
peacekeeping in relation to UN peacekeeping missions. Even so, available material is mostly 
on MONUC and not MONUSCO which is the current UN mission deployed in the DRC. 
Therefore, it would have been much better if the study was done as a field research study in 
the DRC to investigate peacekeeping through interviews, focus group discussions and 
observations. However, due to the unavailability of funds such was not possible.  
 
1.8 Structure of the Study 
This study comprises five chapters:  
 
Chapter One: This chapter is an introduction of the study. It gives an overall background 
and purpose of study; provides a statement of problem(s) so as to highlight why the study was 
conducted; includes a literature survey with research questions; briefly outlines the aims and 
objectives of the study; explains the importance of the study, methodology and research 
design and; outlines the problems and limitations and the structure of this study. 
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Chapter Two: This chapter will undertake the setting of the scene. It will examine the 
DRC’s socio-economic and political conditions prior to the arrival of MONUSCO and 
SADC. It will also identify and explain factors that gave rise to their deployment in the DRC 
conflict. 
 
Chapter Three: This chapter will evaluate the challenges and constraints of MONUSCO and 
SADC in the DRC conflict. It will do so through assessing those factors that hamper their 
role(s) in peacekeeping in the DRC. 
 
Chapter Four: This chapter is the discussion of findings. It will analyze MONUSCO and 
SADC in conflict resolution in the DRC. It will also highlight peacekeeping partnerships 
between local and international bodies’ and the challenges and constraints they endure in 
conflict ridden areas. 
 
Chapter Five: This chapter is the concluding chapter. It will present a summary of the study 
and suggest solutions and transformation for conflict and policy initiatives. It will draw 
logical conclusions from research findings and recommend solutions to challenges and 


















SETTING THE SCENE 
 
This chapter sets the scene of the DRC conflict. It starts by examining the DRC’s socio-
economic and political conditions prior to the arrival of MONUSCO and SADC. It then 
identifies and explains factors that gave rise to the deployment of the two peacekeeping 
bodies’ in the DRC conflict. Overall, the chapter aims to provide insight around the origins, 
causes and context of conflict in the country. 
 
2.1 The DRC’s socio-economic and political conditions 
Colonization of the DRC by Belgium ended on 30 June, 1960. According to the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) cited in Erero et al (2014: 3) the DRC was one of the most highly 
developed countries in Africa in the 1960’s, coming second after South Africa. However, just 
a few months after attaining its independence it plunged into deep political crisis and social 
instability (Tshiyoyo, 2012: 11). The DRC had very limited human and institutional capacity 
for good governance and even for establishing a functional government (Obidegwa, 2004: 4). 
As a result, it had been mired in conflict for well over a decade, with devastating effects on 
its civilian population (Carayannis, 2009: 6). Post-colonial DRC has been faced with deep-
seated political, economic and social challenges, due to failure by its various governments to 
provide amicable solutions. Generally speaking, the DRC has not protected its territory and 
provided peace and security to its citizens, which are its most fundamental duties. 
(N’Gwambwa, 2011: 2). 
 
According to Weijs et al (2012) when Mobutu took control of the DRC (then Congo Free 
State) he renamed it to Zaire, and established a system of governance in which he was seen as 
the centre of authority. As a result, he impersonalized the state by assuming the role ‘Father 
of the nation’, thus turning it into a neo-patrimonial state and ensured his power through 
using state resources to reward his supporters. This system of rewarding his supporters 
entailed placing them in leading positions, thus an accelerated increase in the number of 
public servants and employees of state companies (Weijs et al, 2012: 4). The Mobutu regime 
began with an assurance of prosperity and an end to conflict, but it instead became identified 
with corruption, repression, and failed social and economic programs (N’Gambwa, 2011: 2). 
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The state operated like a business project for Mobutu and his cronies. In 1990, he announced 
that Zaire would move towards democracy following political pressure from the international 
community, but he repeatedly delayed elections (Schoppert, 2013: 76). In the midst of nearly 
total bureaucratic collapse to form new relations with his followers and foreign actors, 
Mobutu claimed a growing share of French foreign aid. He manipulated and co-opted illegal 
trade as means to fund his influence and arbitrated ethnic conflicts in order to promote his 
cronies (Reno, 1997: 494). However, he did not attract an internal support base as he was a 
“pro-Western pond” (Cone, 2007: 91). Nevertheless, according to Putzel et al (2008: v-vi) 
Mobutu’s administration made considerable gains both in education and in health services. In 
the former it attained a 92 percent enrolment rate in primary schools and had a remarkable 
development of the secondary and tertiary education sectors. In the latter it radically 
expended education health personnel, achieve a 95 percent vaccination rate against childhood 
diseases and formed a primary health care system which was desired in other parts of the 
region. 
 
Mobutu was succeeded by Laurent Kabila, who gained influence through revolutionary 
means supported by neighbouring states such as Angola, Namibia and Zimbabwe. When he 
took to office of the presidency in May 1997, he also changed the name of the country from 
Mobutu’s Zaire to DRC. Again like his predecessor, he too had a plan for the DRC and he 
assured that he would end conflict and developed the lives of his million followers 
(N’Gambwa, 2011: 2). However, conditions that had previously given rise to Mobutu’s 
authoritarian and exploitive type of leadership style resurfaced in the Kabila regime 
(Kabemba, 2001: 11). Therefore, “shortly after taking office Laurent Kabila nullified the 
Transitional Act, abolished all political parties and took monopoly of executive, legislative 
and military powers” (Baroncelli, 2013: 4). He also turned his back on his foreign supporters 
and applied ethnical nepotism by hiring supporters who shared his Katangan ethnicity to top 
political positions. As a result, his administration did not receive widespread acceptance, as 
he drew support from only a small base of Katangan backers (Cone, 2007: 91-92).  
 
Laurent Kabila was later succeeded by his son Joseph Kabila following his death in 2001. At 
the time of his death, Laurent Kabila had not ended conflict in the DRC and therefore misery 
remained a way of life for the Congolese. Both he and Mobutu did not honor the promises 
they had made, and part of the reasons for both of them was their incompetence. Another 
issue was accountability, as the two came to power by force they were not well received by 
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the Congolese (N’Gwambwa, 2011: 2). According to Tshiyoyo (2012: 13), Mobutu and 
Laurent Kabila were leaders imposed on the Congolese people by imperialists. In line with 
Tshiyoyo’s assertion, Mamdani (1998) states that Mobutu “was put in place and kept there by 
Western interests”. His successor, Laurent Kabila, ascended to power through revolutionary 
means with the support of neighbor states.  Therefore, Congolese had never had the chance to 
elect any of the presidents into office (Cone, 2007: 91).  
 
The complex history of disorder and weak governance left the DRC as one of Africa’s 
poorest and least developed countries. This was despite the states opulent endowments of 
both natural and human resources, and a large economic potential. Out of all African 
countries it naturally interacted with, the DRC did not only suffer from political instability, 
but it also suffered from negative economic growth and deteriorating social conditions for 
almost two decades (Vaillant et al, 2009: 4). Akitoby and Cinyabuguma (2004: 5) argue that 
despite having rich endowments of both natural and human resources the DRC had a 
generally awfully poor economic performance. Forty years were lost to complete 
maladministration of the economy and lack of overall governance. Maton, Schoors and Van 
Bauwel (1998) cited in Akitoby and Cinyabuguma (2004: 5) claim that the evolution in real 
gross domestic products (GDP) as from 1960 can practically be separated into five sub-
periods: 
 
(a) 1960-65: political chaos and economic disruption; 
(b) 1966-74: stability and growth; 
(c) 1975-82: economic recession and debt crisis; 
(d) 1983-89: adjustment under the IMF and stop-and-go policies; and 
      (e) 1990-2000: hyperinflation and collapse of the economic and political system. 
 
According to Akitoby and Cinyabuguma (2004: 6) the period between 1960 and 1965 
experienced a drop in the overall economic output, with real GDP dropping by approximately 
4 percent. The decline was caused by interruptions in the transport network as well as the 
withdrawal of numerous foreign entrepreneurs after a political uproar, civil conflict and the 
unsuccessful withdrawal from the Katanga province. However, there was stability and growth 
in the period between 1966 and 1974 as there was an escalated participation by the state in 
the prolific spheres of the economy. The growing national economic regulation of the 
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economy was complemented by a remarkable economic development, real GDP increased by 
an average of 5.1 percent per annum.  
 
Public investment increased by four times because of the La Politique des Grands Travaux1. 
In 1971, Plan Decennal 1971-80 (the first Mobutu plan) was introduced with an objective of 
an increased annual real GDP growth of approximately 7 percent. In light of this background, 
the government moved towards the nationalization of all small, medium and large foreign 
enterprises between 1973 and 1974. However, a reversal in copper prices and the 1973 oil 
crisis both caused adverse terms of trade shocks that shortly revealed the centralized 
economy’s severe limitations (Akitoby and Cinyabuguma, 2004: 6). 
 
The period from 1975 to 1982 witnessed a debt crisis that caused an economic recession with 
overall real GDP dropping by 12 percent. The crisis was caused by misguided fiscal plans 
and public investments of the early 70s. In 1975, the DRC ceased repaying its debts and 
asked for an IMF support plan to rescue the country from its economic crisis. However, due 
to the general economic decline, the “public investment plan was grounded, money invested 
in useless expensive possessions was lost, and the upkeep of infrastructure and productive 
capital was either neglected or suspended” (Akitoby and Cinyabuguma, 2004: 7). 
Consequently, fiscal activity went through serious deterioration that was made worse by the 
1977 and 1978 Shaba Province (now Katanga Province) invasions (Akitoby and 
Cinyabuguma, 2004: 7). 
 
However, in the period between 1983 and 1989 the government began implementation of a 
solid stabilization and liberalization plan in September 1983. Its objective was to improve 
fiscal conditions and eradicate significant misrepresentations that developed during the 
previous period. The plan had a positive effect as real GDP improved by an average  growth 
of 2.6 percent per annum from 1984 to 1986, following a 2.2 percent decline in 1982 
(Akitoby and Cinyabuguma, 2004: 7). In 1987, in cooperation with the IMF and the World 
Bank, the Mobutu administration introduced a structural adjustment plan that was intended 
for establishing a foundation for sustainable economic development and external economic 
position. The plan benefited from improved terms of trade, mostly showing a strong increase 
in copper prices early that year. Therefore, with a more favourable external environment, the 
                                                          
1 According to Akitoby and Cinyabuguma the La Politique des Grands Travaux was a 
determined strategy for financial growth meant for the implementation of significant projects. 
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Mobutu administration concluded its adjustment plan. But, the state’s economic performance 
had a significant declined, with annual real GDP development reduced to an average 0.5 
percent between 1987 and 1989 (Akitoby and Cinyabuguma, 2004: 7).  
 
From 1990 to 2000, the DRC lost control over its economic policies and fell into the control 
of an unparalleled circle of hyperinflation; currency devaluation; cumulative dollarization and 
monetary disintermediation; and deteriorating savings, economic infrastructure, and broad-
based outputs. All this happened during unsuccessful political liberalization efforts, as the 
shocking financial and social condition was compounded by the full-fledged war that took 
place 8 years into the sub-period (Akitoby and Cinyabuguma, 2004:7). In line with Akitoby 
and Cinyabuguma’s assertion De Castillo (2003: 5) argues that the ruthless war that took 
place in 1998 put a lot of strain on public funds and public enterprises. A huge share of the 
DRC’s capital stock was ruined and investments discouraged. Consequently, real GDP 
contracted cumulatively by about 42 percent from 1990 to 2000. Consumer prices increased 
an average rate of 684 percent per annum, whilst government revenues dropped by 80 
percent, and outside debt increased to approximately 300 percent of GDP (Akitoby and 
Cinyabuguma, 2004: 7).  
 
Furthermore, Erero et al (2014: 3) argue that from 1990 to 2001 the DRC was in an economic 
recession caused by the absence of political unity and continuous armed conflict. The 
economy dropped reaching a growth rate of -13.5 percent in 1993. While GDP experienced a 
growing decrease of over 53 percent and the GDP per capita fell by 37.9 percent from US$ 
204.9 in 1990 to US$ 127.32 in 2001. According to Akitoby and Cinyabuguma (2004: 8) 
considering their contributions to GDP, agriculture, mining and transport were the most 
significant sectors. The combination of agriculture, forestry, animal husbandry and fishing 
created jobs for over 75 percent of the workforce and was responsible for typically around 45 
percent of real GDP. The agricultural sector had great potential as a basis of financial 
development, export diversification, and gainful employment. However, it’s out-put did not 
show substantial growth, instead its contribution to exports constantly dropped by more than 
30 percent in 2000 from over 40 percent of exports in 1960. 
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Agricultural growth was constrained by several factors, namely “deterioration of the network 
of rural feeder roads; dislocation caused by the Zairianization2 measures of 1973-74; 
inadequate credit for small-scale producers; lack of foreign exchange for essential imports; 
insufficient storage and other marketing facilities; and the uncertainties created by the 
government’s pricing policies” (Akitoby and Cinyabuguma, 2004: 8). The DRC had an 
abundance of natural resources, but its mining potential remained largely unlocked. It had a 
wide range of mineral resources and most of its mining was done by the biggest government 
owned company, the Générale des Carrières et des Mines (GECAMINES), that was 
responsible for more than 90 percent of overall copper production as well as the whole cobalt 
and zinc output. While the Societé minière de Bakwanga (MIBA), a partially state-owned 
company was in charge of the industrial mining of diamonds. Individual prospectors were 
responsible for approximately 60 percent of overall diamond production (Akitoby and 
Cinyabuguma, 2004: 9). 
 
The mining sector’s contributions to GDP and export earnings were constantly decreasing. In 
the mid-80s, the sector was responsible for nearly a quarter of real GDP and it contributed 
more than 70 percent of export receipts. But twenty years later, even though the sector 
continued to be the primary source of export earning, it was responsible for only 6 percent of 
real GDP. Amongst the problems that affected the sector’s development was a lawful and 
regulatory framework that was not favourable for the growth of the private sector, severe 
transport problems; and a continuous deficiency of investment (Akitoby and Cinyabuguma, 
2004:9). According to Erero et al (2014: 3) due to illicit exports of much of its own natural 
resources, the DRC did not gain anything from international trade. This affected the country’s 
participation in the world economy, while allowing for neighbouring states and rebel 
movements to benefit from those resources. For instance, eastern Kasai’s “natural resources 
were exploited to an excessive degree by both the allied forces and the rebels” (Grega et al, 
2008: 21). 
 
At independence the DRC inherited an all-inclusive transport system that comprised 
tactically interconnected roads, rivers, and railways. The transport sector was responsible for 
approximately 12 percent of real GDP from 1960 to 2000. Due to the big size of the DRC, its 
                                                          
2 According to Akitoby and Cinyabuguma the Zairianization was a process made up of 
nationalization of numerous external enterprises. 
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restricted admission to sea and the aloofness of its mineral deposits, a sectoral network was of 
paramount significance to current as well as upcoming financial activity. Nevertheless, the 
transport performance remained below acceptable, and challenges in the sector constituted 
major problems to the realization of the country’s huge agro-industrial and mining potential 
(Akitoby and Cinyabuguma, 2004:10). 
 
Akitoby and Cinyabuguma (2004) note that three public agencies; the National Railway 
Company of the Congo (SNCC), the National Transport Agency (ONATRA), and the Roads 
authority of the DRC (The Office des Routes) played a significant role as they were 
respectively in charge of operating road and river transport, as well as constructing and 
upholding the main highway network. However, the fiscal condition of the first two agencies 
deteriorated immensely from 1985. Over and above that, the services they provided on the 
Voie Nationale3, which combined road and water routes from Shaba mines to the Madati 
harbour, increasingly deteriorated (Akitoby and Cinyabuguma, 2004: 10). They also note that 
the disappointing performance by the SNCC and the ONATRA emanated from several issues 
comprising interruptions in regulating prices in an overly inflated environment; a reduction, 
or better yet immobility in traffic; high operation prices; and a protracted lack of upkeep. 
Furthermore, in the late 90s the civil war had a negative effect on the transport sector, which 
resulted in an infrastructure collapse. Consequently, farmers had a huge challenge selling any 
surplus, whilst the cost of food in urban areas was relatively high (Akitoby and 
Cinyabuguma, 2004: 10). 
 
Therefore, fiscal management, corruption, political chaos and civil conflict, all played part in 
the awfully low and dwindling per capita income, dreadful living circumstances, human 
rights abuses, and dismal prospects for human development. The ruthless war that took place 
in 1998 placed a lot of pressure on public finances and public enterprises. It also resulted in 
the economy falling into hyperinflation and the currency becoming insignificant, with savings 
and investment dropping, and fiscal intermediation failing (de Castillo, 2003: 5).  
 
As expected, the DRC’s longstanding economic decline was supplemented by a deep 
weakening of its social sector. For instance, life expectancy dropped to around 46 years in 
2000, after having increased up to 51 years in 1987. Rates in child deaths escalated all 
                                                          
3 The Voie Nationale is a rail main line into the DRC that runs from Matadi port to Kinshasa 
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through the 90s and reached 162 per thousand live births in the year 2000. Gross primary 
school registrations dropped to less than 50 percent in the late 90s from over 90 percent in the 
mid-80s and 98 percent on the day before DRC’s independence (Englebert, 2006: 56). 
Furthermore, a report by the World Bank (2014) cited in Erero et al (2014: 3) notes that the 
number of people who were unemployed rose to nearly 70 percent. The rise was accredited to 
the failing formal sector and failure by the jobless to get into the informal labour markets. 
Whereas formal sector job creation failed to keep up with the growing labour force 
environment. As a result, the unemployed turned to the informal sector, with informal 
employment accounting for 80 percent of job creation in the 90s. 
 
DRC’s history is characterized by autocracy, violence, economic hardship, and widespread 
injustice. Its history has led it from the Congo Free State to Zaire and now the DRC. The 
scars inflicted by its history permeate current conflict dynamics in the DRC (Cone, 2007: 71). 
“Years after gaining its independence from Belgium, the DRC remains plagued by continuing 
governance challenges, corruption, insecurity, and widespread poverty. State institutions are 
generally weak, and efforts to bring lasting peace and security have so far produced mixed 
results. While the western part of the country enjoys relative calm, violent conflict persists in 
much of the eastern DRC, perpetrated by armed militias, both domestic and foreign” 
(N’Gambwa, 2011: 1).  
 
According to a report by the Institute for Global Dialogue (2012) the country’s political 
culture does not yet offer productive grounds for democratic developments.  Its current 
political situation is comprised of rival claims to the country’s presidency, an effectively 
illegitimate and paralyzed National Assembly, difficulties in constituting a new government, 
as well as uncertainty over the organization of provincial and national elections (IGD, 2012: 
4). A transformation index by Bertelsmann Stiftung (2012) argues that a lot of institutions 
and non-states entities, namely political organizations and civil society groups lack internal 
democracy. A lot of times they are distinguished as the personal rule of individuals. Even the 
president’s office does not adhere to the democratic processes enshrined in the constitution 
and prescribed by the political structure. Alternatively, the use of corruption to gain political 
objectives continues to be a normal technique to sway legislators in important decision-




According to Dagne (2011) bilateral and multilateral contributors made noteworthy 
investments in support of the country’s transitional developments. The World Bank has 
various ongoing ventures in the country. The IMF required the country to implement 
modifications in macroeconomic stability before it began a poverty alleviation and growth 
facility program. There is a tight economic plan which is mainly concentrated on growing 
local income and fluctuating government expenditure towards infrastructure and social 
sector. Also, the DRC’s Central Bank seems dedicated to upholding price stability and 
constricted regulation of the country’s money supply, according to the Economist Intelligence 
Unit (EIU) (Dagne, 2011: 12). As a result, the DRC’s fiscal performance has developed 
significantly in the past few years, although progress in alleviating poverty and meeting the 
Millennium Development Goal (MDG) has logged. In mid-2010, the DRC obtained debt 
relief under the enriched heavily indebted poor countries (HIPC) enterprise, this followed 
prudent macroeconomic policies and structural reforms that underpinned the economic 
performance. The debt relief reduced the DRC’s external debt burden from about over 136 
percent of GDP in 2009 to nearly 35 percent at the end of 2010 (IMF, 2013: 4). 
 
Nevertheless, according to a transformation index by Bertelsmann Stiftung (2014) as a result 
of many years of ongoing violent conflicts, the government’s inappropriate economic 
governance style and a strong embedded culture of corruption, the DRC continues to face 
many economic and social challenges. A bulk of the people has been living in abject poverty 
for years. The government provides only a few services to major cities, for which availability 
is also limited to those related to those in positions of power and influence. Whilst in most 
rural areas service delivery is largely nonexistence. As a result, for many people survival is 
simply guaranteed by subsistence farming and informal small-scale trading, although 
currently limited due to the ongoing violence. Nevertheless, persons with access to the power 
controlled largely by the governing presidential alliance and some instances by armed groups, 
live relatively comfortable lives (BTI, 2014: 17).  
 
Congolese have suffered a great loss of lives and livelihoods as a result of nearly 20 years of 
war and insecurity. The recent DRC political and economic crisis is somewhat the result of 
both the 1996 and 1998 wars, and the high levels of insecurity that ensued. However, the 
process of economic downturn, institutional deterioration, and loss of national assets can be 




2.2 Factors that gave rise to MONUSCO and SADC deployment in the DRC 
SADC and MONUSCO deployment in the country was a result of the Second Congo War 
that began in August 1998. The war became known as “Africa’s First World War” due to the 
participation of at least six regional countries. “The war quickly engulfed the country 
characterised by extreme violence, mass population displacements, widespread rape, and a 
collapse of public health services. The outcome had been a humanitarian disaster unmatched 
by any other in recent decades” (Coghlan et al, 2004). According to the International Rescue 
Committee (IRC) cited in Nangini et al (2014: 3) even though the exact figures are disputed, 
the Second Congo War is reported to have killed approximately 3.3 million people between 
1998 and 2002. It began as relations between Laurent Kabila and his Rwandan and 
Congolese Tutsi followers faded, causing an attack by Rwanda and Uganda on 2 August, 
1998, and an unsuccessful protest on Kinshasa from 6 August to 1 September. Meanwhile, 
the anti-Kabila Rally for Congolese Democracy (RCD) was made up of Congolese rebels in 
the city of Goma (North Kivu), however  its lack of a widespread backing encouraged 
Uganda to support the Movement for the Liberation of Congo (MLC) rebel movement in 
November 1998 (Nzongola-Ntalaja, 2002: 231). 
 
Obasanjo and Mills (2014) assert that politically, the DRC conflict was primarily motivated 
by poor governance, the struggle for control of power and unconstitutional change of 
government. Economically, factors that triggered conflict included corruption, struggle for 
ownership, management and control, as well as uneven supply of natural resources. Socially, 
dynamics that encouraged intervention by international organizations in the country were 
inadequate capacity for diversity management against minorities, marginalization based on 
ethnical and religious differences, and alienation and consequent disillusionment of the youth 
(Obasanjo and Mills, 2014: 5). According to Ahere (2012) various actors in compound 
arrangements participated in the Second Congo War. There were those who backed Kabila, 
and those who were against him. The former comprised the DRC, Namibia, Angola, Chad, 
Zimbabwe, Sudan, the Hutu and Mai Mai allied forces. Whilst the latter comprised Burundi, 
Uganda, Rwanda, the MLC, the RCD and Tutsi aligned forces (Ahere, 2012: 2). 
 
Dzinesa and Laker (2010) argue that SADC member states intervened in the DRC at a time 
where the organization was going through an internal struggle for influence. At that particular 
period, the SADC Organ on Politics, Defence and Security Co-operation (OPDSC) was 
presided by Zimbabwe, while South Africa presided over SADC. Member states were split 
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regarding the type of intervention that was to be employed in the DRC, and the divisions 
worsened the crisis that was instigated by disagreements amongst member states on whether 
the Organ should operate under, or autonomously from SADC (Dzinesa and Laker, 2010: 
20). Angola, Namibia and Zimbabwe formed an alliance and decided to employ military 
intervention in favour of President Laurent Kabila’s administration, and then signed a joint 
defense agreement with Kinshasa in April 1999. Whilst other SADC members comprising 
South Africa, Swaziland, Mozambique, Lesotho and Botswana decided on a method which 
emphasized preventative diplomacy and a negotiated settlement of the conflict (Dzinesa and 
Laker, 2010: 20). 
 
Three months later, on July 10, 1999, conflict in the DRC was brought to an end, at least on 
paper when the DRC, Uganda, Rwanda, Namibia, Zimbabwe and Angola signed the Lusaka 
peace accord. Facilitated by SADC and the late former President Frederick Chiluba of 
Zambia, the agreement asked for a Chapter VII UN peacekeeping force “to ensure 
implementation of the Agreement; and taking into account the peculiar situation of the DRC, 
mandated the peacekeeping force to track down all armed groups in the DRC” (Fontes, 2003: 
158). 
 
Holt and Berkman (2006) claim the UN was surprised by the request of a vigorous 
peacekeeping force. Therefore, knowing the huge problems that came with ending the crisis 
in the DRC, the international community was in two minds about the country’s commitment 
to ending conflict. There was also a commonly shared perspective that the UN did not “own” 
the treaty; therefore, the organization was not accountable for its application. Furthermore, a 
certain diplomat complained that “the Congo file started in Africa, not in the United Nations” 
(Holt and Berkman, 2006: 158). Whilst a UN official asserted that “the Lusaka Agreement 
called for UN forces. They did not know what they were writing. The UN was not there, it 
came with a framework that was not theirs” (Holt and Berkman, 2006: 158). Therefore, 
employing peacekeepers to disarm troops is a difficult task. “It would be difficult, if not 
impossible, to identify troop contributing countries willing to contribute contingents to be 
deployed in eastern DRC for forcible disarmament of groups accused of genocide and other 
serious crimes against humanity, at least in sufficient numbers and with a sufficiently robust 




Nonetheless, in August 1999, the UNSC authorized the deployment of 90 UN military liaison 
personnel to the DRC. Three months later, Security Council Resolution 1279 declared that 
the previously authorized UN troops would establish the UN Organization Mission in the 
DRC (MONUC) (Dagne, 2011: 9). The organization was established as a traditional Chapter 
VI peacekeeping operation to observe and monitor the Lusaka peace accord. However, 
because of the multifaceted conflict situation in which the peacekeeping operation was 
operating, the organization rapidly progressed into a more vigorous Chapter VII operation 
(Reynaert, 2011: 14). The mission was a Chapter VII UN peacekeeping force authorized to 
implement its mandate using force, if and when required to do so. Thereafter, to strengthen 
the missions force and its mandate the Security Council approved numerous resolutions from 
2000 to 2010. For instance, in 2000 the Security Council approved Resolution 1291 which 
authorized MONUC to implement various significant responsibilities, comprising execution 
of the ceasefire accord, confirmation of disengagement and redeployment of forces, and the 
backing of humanitarian efforts and human rights monitoring. The resolution provided the 
organization the mandate, under Chapter VII, to safeguard its troops, facilities, and non-
combatants facing impending threat of physical violence (Dagne, 2011: 10). 
 
According to Fargo (2006) due to instability and insecurity the authorization was postponed. 
MONUC also added about 5 000 peacekeepers, as forces backed by Zimbabwe, Angola and 
Namibia continued fighting in the eastern parts of the country. In spite of continued violence 
the UNSC had not passed any resolutions authorizing the withdrawal of external forces from 
the DRC. Furthermore, MONUC had also not sent any peacekeeping forces to the eastern 
DRC, even though it was the region with more hostilities and instability. However, four 
months later, the Security Council approved resolution 1304 that ultimately called for the 
withdrawal of foreign troops. But the resolution was disregarded as no troops withdrew 
(Fargo, 2006: 55). 
 
In February 2001, the Security Council adopted resolution 1341 which outlined the time limit 
for the detachment and redeployment of belligerent parties. The resolution gave them 14 days 
to vacate the DRC with a time limit of a comprehensive withdrawal of all troops by 15 May, 
2001 (Fargo, 2006: 55-56). A year later, President Paul Kagame of Rwanda signed a 
ceasefire agreement with the DRC that comprised the removal of its own military personnel. 
To return the favour, the DRC had to disarm and repatriate all troops linked to the Army for 
the Liberation of Rwanda (ALiR) who were responsible for the 1994 Rwandan genocide.  A 
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few months later, Uganda joined in and promised to withdraw all its troops from the DRC 
(Fargo, 2006: 57).  
 
According to Bope (2011) MONUC troops were strengthened with 2366 soldiers and 363 
more military observers who came from different countries such as South Africa, Uruguay, 
Morocco, Senegal and Tunisia were authorized to monitor the disengagement of different 
forces to the conflict and the removal of the Rwandan and Ugandan militaries (Bope, 2011: 
30). However, UN troops in their positions faced several difficulties for protecting the 
civilian population and even MONUC personnel from the violent conflict in the eastern DRC 
(Bope, 2011: 30). Therefore, following difficulties experienced by UN observers and troops 
in the deployment areas, the Security Council voted for resolution 1355, giving MONUC the 
capacity of disarmament, demobilization, repatriation and reintegration (DDRR) processes of 
the militias group (Bope, 2011: 30). The achievement of MONUC operation with respect to 
the above process led the Security Council to vote for resolution 1376, allowing the 
deployment of MONUC troops in all eastern provinces of the DRC (Bope, 2011: 30). 
 
On 14 June 2002, through resolution 1417, the Security Council reaffirmed MONUC’s 
mandate to explicitly emphasize the necessity to protect “civilians under imminent threat of 
physical violence” (Punga, 2011: 39). Protection of non-combatants was authorized only 
“within the mission’s capabilities” (Punga, 2011: 39). In December of the very same year, the 
Security Council extended the missions mandate by resolution 1445 that approved the 
expansion of the military component of MONUC’s intervention forces in the DRC and 
increased the number of blue helmets to 8500. Subsequently, MONUC, without using force, 
monitored the removal of all external forces from DRC territory, and supported voluntary 
disarmament, demobilization, repatriation, reinsertion and reintegration (DDRRR) process 
(Bope, 2011: 31). 
 
A year later, MONUC deployed its troops along the front lines in the east of the DRC in 
order to conduct DDRRR operations. Some of the UN contingents were deployed especially 
in Ituri where they monitored grave human rights violations while Ugandan troops were 
withdrawn, a situation which temporarily weakened MONUC. The situation and certain key 
parts of the DRC led the Security Council to vote for resolution 1493 which gave MONUC a 
new mandate. Resolution 1493 increased the military personnel to 10, 800 in leading the 
operation to impose an arms embargo on the one hand, and mandated MONUC to utilise all 
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required measures to accomplish its mandate in Ituri and in North and South Kivu (Bope, 
2011: 31). Resolution 1493 mandated the organization to help the DRC government to disarm 
foreign troops and repatriate them to homelands. The resolution, under Chapter VII mandated 
MONUC to use “all means necessary” to implement its mandate (Dagne, 2011: 10). 
 
In 2004, the Security Council extended the organizations authorization by resolution 1565 
which increased MONUC’s strength with 5900 personnel taking into account the 
development of the condition in Ituri and Bakavu. The Security Council decided to give 
MONUC the mandate of: deploying and upholding a presence in important parts of potential 
instability in order to promote the restoration of confidence; to discourage violence and allow 
UN troops to operate freely, specifically in the eastern parts of the DRC; guaranteeing the 
defence of non-combatants, comprising humanitarian personnel facing eminent danger of 
bodily harm; guaranteeing the defence of UN troops, facilities, installations and equipment; 
guaranteeing the security and freedom of movement of its troops; launching the necessary 
border security within Operation in Burundi; and with the governments of the DRC and 
Burundi to synchronize efforts to monitor and discourage cross-border activities of soldiers 
between the two nations (Bope, 2011: 32).  
 
According to Dagne (2011: 10) resolution 1565 increased MONUC personnel, with the 
purpose of deploying them to eastern DRC in order to guarantee civilian protection and to 
snatch or collect arms, as was called for in UN resolution 1493. The resolution also mandated 
the organization to provisionally offer protection to the National Unity Government (NUG) 
establishments and government representatives. Furthermore, Cammaert (no-date: 105) 
argues that Security Council resolution 1565 particularly mandated the mission “to support 
operations to disarm foreign combatants led by the Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic 
of Congo (FARDC)”. MONUC personnel were targeted by militia groups in Ituri, whilst the 
rebellious General Laurent Nkunda occupied Bukavu. As a result, MONUC troops were 
forced to retaliate with open fire in protection of their own installation (Bope, 2011: 32).   
 
In October 28, 2005, the Security Council adopted resolution 1635 which increased the 
operation with 300 military personnel for the deployment of joint operations blue helmets 
FARDC in Oriental province. MONUC facilitated discussions between a military group, the 
Congolese Revolutionary Movement (MRC) and the government. As a result, several 
militiamen were disarmed in Ituri province and integrated into the FARDC (Bope, 2011: 33). 
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In the following year, as support to the DRC’s electoral process, the Security Council adopted 
resolution 1671 which authorized European Union (EU) forces to help MONUC to 
coordinate national and local elections held in July 2006 (Bope, 2011: 33).  
 
On 22 December, 2008, MONUC became the UN’s biggest peacekeeping operation when the 
Security Council extended the missions mandate through resolution 1856. The Security 
Council approved the deployment of an additional 3085 troops and stressed “that the 
temporal increase in personnel was to enable MONUC to reinforce its capacity to protect 
civilians” (Punga, 2011: 39). However, even though increasingly emphasized throughout 
MONUC’s mandates, the protection of civilians was only among approximately 50 tasks, 
until December 2008, when through resolution 1856, the Security Council set it as a priority. 
Nevertheless, MONUC’s mandate covered roughly 41 different tasks, many of which were 
contradictory, as highlighted by MONUC’s former Special Representative of the Secretary-
General Allan Doss: “ending the crisis is a political task, protecting civilians is a 
humanitarian task, disarming militias and improving the performance of the Congolese armed 
forces is a military task with human rights issues as an overlay and background” (Punga, 
2011: 41). The complexity of the mandate deters focus from civilian protection, as 
peacekeepers are divided between the various tasks (Punga, 2011: 41). 
 
According to the International Peace Institute (2011) in November 2009, ahead of the DRC’s 
centenary of 50 years of independence in June the following year, Joseph Kabila publicly 
called for the UN peacekeepers to start retreating from the country. His argument was that the 
stability of the country had hugely developed as most ex rebels had assimilated into the 
FARDC, and Kinshasa and Kigali had decided to dismantle the remaining militias in the 
Kivus.  He viewed UN personnel as only playing a restricted part in safeguarding the DRC. 
However, the UNSC counter argued his claims on the basis that over 1.5 million people were 
still displaced due to uncertainties in eastern parts of the country. Therefore, based on this 
argument the UNSC resisted the call to close down the peacekeeping mission and eventually 
an agreement to retain the UN mission was reached (IPI, 2011: 2). 
 
A month later, Security Council resolution 1906 approved MONUC’s mandate till the end of 
May 2010. The Kabila regime again requested the removal of the organizations forces by 
mid-2011. As a result, a UNSC delegation visited the DRC in mid-May and met with high-
ranking representatives. The delegation was headed by Ambassador Gerard Araud from 
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France who was captured saying “the mission of the Security Council was to begin a dialogue 
with the authorities, the population and civil society of the Democratic Republic of the Congo 
over the future of the United Nations presence” (Dagne, 2011: 10). Subsequently, since 
February 2010, the organization had a total of 20, 573 uniformed personnel, comprising 18, 
645 troops, 760 armed observers, 1, 216 police, 1, 001 international civilian personnel, 2, 690 
domestic staff and 629 UN volunteers. Therefore, the organization was presently the biggest 
UN peacekeeping mission in the world (Dagne, 2011: 10). 
 
Under resolution 1925 of May 2010, the Security Council decided that as of July 2010, 
MONUC would be changed into the UN Organization Stabilization Mission in the DRC 
(MONUSCO). As a result of the developing political situation, the latter would largely 
concentration on stabilization and peace consolidation. However, civilian protection would 
remain the operations number one priority. The mission would continue focussing on 
disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) and Security Sector Reform (SSR). 
Resolution 1925 also took the DRC government’s point of view into consideration, as the 
Security Council mandated the removal of a maximum of 2, 000 military personnel in those 
areas where security situations permitted it. Resolution 1925 differed with the prior 
resolutions as it did not obviously state that MONUSCO was to prevent efforts of military 
groups to rupture the ceasefire process. Neither did it mention that MONUSCO was to 
assume pre-emptive action to defend non-combatants or interrupt the military capacity of 















CHALLENGES AND CONSTRAINTS OF MONUSCO AND SADC 
 
3.1 The SADC in peacekeeping in the DRC: 
Conflict in the DRC began at a time where the SADC was organizationally divided. SADC 
was led by the South Africa’s late former President Nelson Mandela, while the Organ on 
Politics, Defence and Security Co-operation (OPDSC) was led by Zimbabwe’s President 
Robert Mugabe. The latter was permitted to function independently from the former, and 
required no approval to make decisions from its chair or even a bulk of its member states. 
However, this created tension between the two leaders as they both struggled to attain more 
control in the SADC (Schoppert, 2013: 66-67). Initially, the office of the OPDSC chair was 
supposed to change yearly, but that all changed when Robert Mugabe became chair. After 
taking office he often solely took decisions on SADC’s behalf without communicating with 
its member states and members of its Organ. However, such an act was a result of the 
authority given to the OPDSC to function autonomously at summit level, the highest level of 
power in the SADC (Schoppert, 2013: 67).  
 
Therefore, on 7 and 8 August 1998, Robert Mugabe convened a Summit of Heads of States 
and Government in Victoria Falls, Zambia, but excluded South Africa because of the tension 
between himself and Mandela over the Organ (Nathan, 2004: 12). As a result, SADC was 
divided between peaceful and aggressive methods to regional security. The faction that 
preferred the latter method comprised Zimbabwe, Angola and Namibia; it chose a mutual 
defense deal and opted for defense collaboration and an armed response to the DRC conflict 
(Nathan, 2013: 3). Therefore, Zimbabwe spearheaded armed intervention that involved 
sending troops to the DRC in defense of President Laurent Kabila (Hwang, 2006: 170).  
 
On the other hand, Nelson Mandela was against military intervention, he instead encouraged 
peaceful negotiated settlement of the conflict. “He insisted that the SADC troops could only 
intervene in the DRC under the auspices of the UN-sanctioned multilateral peacekeeping 
force” (Monyae, 2014: 124). Therefore, the peaceful faction comprising Botswana, 
Mauritius, Mozambique, Tanzania and South Africa, regarded the OPDSC as a mutual 
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security organization whose main sources of coordination and peacemaking were political 
rather than military (Nathan, 2013: 3).  
 
According to Mugadza (2011) the split intervention approaches caused suspicions between 
SADC member states that stirred up allegations about plots. Zimbabwe was accused of 
abusing DRC’s mineral and timber resources in return for its intervention (Khan, 2012: 329). 
According to Schoppert (2013: 68) Robert Mugabe’s motives for leading the SADC’s 
intervention were politically and economically driven. Politically, his desire to proclaim his 
leadership as a senior politician and to remove himself from Nelson Mandela’s shadow 
influenced Zimbabwe’s interests in the DRC conflict (Kapinga, 2015: 105). Economically, 
Kabila had declared that he would reward states that would assist him, and therefore, with 
Zimbabwe’s already collapsing economy, Robert Mugabe decided to intervene. The country 
was able to spend US$30 million per month on intervention in the DRC and while this 
speeded up the weakening of the economy it also came with benefits, especially for the elites 
(Schoppert, 2013: 68).  
 
Zimbabwe was rewarded with hundred acres of farmland and its troops were directly given 
contracts with mining companies and concessions. As conflict persisted, Kabila then 
rewarded Zimbabwe’s continued assistance with additional contracts with mining companies 
and concessions and gave its troops permission to take from the DRC land they lived on 
(Schoppert, 2013: 69). Angola equally had its motives for intervening in the DRC conflict. 
Similar to Robert Mugabe and his Zimbabwe, Angola also intervened due to personal 
reasons. Firstly, it was indebted to Katangan soldiers who ensured that the country gained its 
independence. Therefore, Kabila’s minister who was a Katangan made sure to remind Angola 
of its debt. Secondly, Angola was not pleased with its two allies, Uganda and Rwanda, who 
entered into its neighbor state (the DRC) without informing them. Therefore, this was enough 
reason for Angola to sends its troops to the DRC in support of the SADC’s military 
intervention (Schoppert, 2013: 69).  
 
Namibia, which was the third SADC member state to support armed intervention in the DRC 
did so in reaction to a request by the other two countries to back Kabila, an old acquaintance 
the then Namibian President Sam Nujoma and lose associate of Zimbabwe and Angola 
(Kapinga, 2015: 105). Just like Angola to the DRC, Namibia was also indebted to Angola for 
having given permission to the South West Africa People’s Organization (SWAPO) to build 
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camps in its southern region in 1996. Therefore, Namibia supported SADC’s military 
intervention in order to establish relations with Angola (Schoppert, 2013: 69). According to 
Kapinga (2015: 104-105) intervention by the three SADC member states was mostly a result 
of their personal interests. Each and every one of them had their personal strategic and 
economic motives for intervening. For instance, their troops were amongst those who were 
comprised in the illicit abuse of the DRC’s natural resources, although in their defense they 
claimed their intervention to have been the backing of a fellow SADC member state 
experiencing external hostility.  
 
On the other hand, others saw South Africa’s peaceful negotiated settlements to the DRC 
conflict as paving way for the abuse of the DRC’s natural resources by its mining companies 
and other corporations (Kabemba, 2006: 152). According to Schoppert (2013: 70) Post-
apartheid South Africa not only had abundant inequalities of affluence, but it also had 
stagnant and excessive rates of poverty that it wanted to eradicate through a strong economic 
community. Therefore, it intervened in the DRC to protect regional stability, essentially for 
building a strong economy and trade relations, since it had just attained freedom from 
apartheid. However, in September 1998, Nelson Mandela and SADC changed their position 
regarding the DRC intervention and declared that SADC backed Zimbabwe, Angola and 
Namibia’s military intervention approach. Nevertheless, Nelson Mandela still wanted to work 
towards ending the DRC conflict through pacific negotiations, but hoped to unite SADC by 
backing military intervention (Schoppert, 2013: 70). Instead SADC’s peace and security was 
threatened and its unity was hampered. Tapfumaneyi cited in Baker and Maeresera (2009: 
109) argues that the divisions at some point impaired the OPDSC and caused an idea of ‘two 
SADC’s’. Therefore, due to the SADC split, only a few member states contributed human 
and financial resources for armed intervention, most of which went toward pacific negotiated 
settlements and coming up with means to end the spread of war (Schoppert, 2013: 71).  
 
Also, due to leadership misunderstandings amongst SADC member states the organization 
failed to respond to intrastate armed conflict that followed an attempt to takeover Bukavu (a 
city in eastern DRC) in June 2004 (Yabadi, 2011: 43). Moreover, although SADC was a 
major player in establishing guidelines, norms, and standards that created space for the 
development and consolidation of open and inclusive governance, it failed to implement its 
declaratory commitments. For instance, during the 2011 DRC elections the 2004 SADC 
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Principles and Guidelines Governing Democratic Elections were not adhered to and were 
even overlooked by the SADC itself (Adebajo et al, 2013: 30). 
 
However, Nathan (2004: 14) argues that “although the tension between South Africa and 
Zimbabwe undoubtedly contributed to the impasse around the Organ, the problems were 
much deeper than that. SADC’s failure to establish a viable security regime was a 
consequence of fundamental political and strategic differences between member states; their 
reluctance to surrender a measure of sovereignty to a security regime; and their economic and 
administrative weaknesses”. The regional political setting was marked by changes in political 
systems and methods of administration that posed a challenge for to regional collaboration 
and assimilation. For instance, SADC encompasses autonomous states like South Africa and 
Botswana, a disintegrated country like the DRC, and dictatorial governments like Zimbabwe 
(Mulaudzi, 2006: 22). This challenge seriously threatened efforts to deepen co-operation and 
assimilation in the SADC region.  
 
As a result, there were no common values among SADC member states since there were 
splits between democratic and authoritarian alignments, and between peaceful and aggressive 
elements in their foreign policies (Schwager, 2012: 148). For instance, at the end of 1993, 
Nelson Mandela said that South Africa’s foreign policy would be guided by human rights. 
Therefore, South Africa promoted human rights and democracy in its external engagement. 
Much of its foreign policy was driven by its values and it regarded its own negotiated 
transition as a model that other countries could follow in seeking to end their own conflicts 
(Sidiropoulos, 2007: 1). As a result, the drafting of the Mutual Defense Pact and 
consolidation of the Organ struggled because of these splits between camps.  
 
According to Mulaudzi (2006: 22) the splits and SADC’s regulatory principles of making 
judgements in groups meant that considerable condemnations by other SADC members were 
disapproved. Therefore, this and the fact that the oppressive era was still recorded in the 
memories of many gave rise to typical unity among SADC member states, which caused 
SADC to ignore the systematic violations of human rights in countries like the DRC and 
Zimbabwe. Furthermore, SADC’s legal configuration hindered instead of advancing the 
organization’s efforts of establishing a regional plan, because it gave member states 
permission to maintain their autonomy in a quest for personal interests over those of the 
region (Mulaudzi, 2006: 22). According to Schwager (2012: 148) owing to political 
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weakness, the absence of shared values, mutual trust and a mutual idea of the security 
administration, SADC member states feared losing their autonomy. This fear prohibited any 
chances of developing and accepting a shared security administration that comprised formal 
rules, obligatory decision-making and domestic affairs intervention prospects.  
 
SADC’s forums and programmes were hampered by the regions small economies, 
underdevelopment and weak administrative capacity. The problem was further complicated 
by the organization’s member states past hatred to integrate the organization of regional 
programmes in a strong secretariat. Due to the resistance to transfer power to a regional 
organization, for many years member states preferred a disseminated model with a small 
secretariat that possess no decision making powers. With regard to collective security 
arrangements, member states chose an informal and flexible approach over one that was 
integrated and constructed on static rules and procedures (Nathan, 2013: 10). 
 
SADC’s overall developed member state is South Africa, and it produced nothing less than 
71 percent gross national products (GNP). Therefore, the country’s economic dominance and 
the huge disparities within and among SADC member states were amongst the organizations 
distinct economic realities. These dynamics cause enormous challenges to market 
assimilation and overall regionalism (Mulaudzi, 2006: 15). According to Mhango (2012) due 
to sporadic collective security arrangements by SADC member states, the DRC is a major 
SADC peacekeeping failure (Mhango, 2012: 13). SADC is also constrained by its somewhat 
inadequate peacekeeping experience, as its ability to act is mainly controlled by reactive 
conflict resolution mechanisms that the organization has established (Gwanyayi et al, 2010: 
2). 
 
3.2 The MONUSCO in peacekeeping in the DRC 
According to Marks (2005: 67), the United Nations Organization Mission in the DRC 
(MONUC) has integrated civilian protection with great difficulty. Its more inert role failed to 
protect non-combatants and destabilized the idea of civilian protection, whilst its more hostile 
actions sporadically led to more civilian abuses. Even though the UN Security Council 
(UNSC) resolution 1291 had requested the mission to take necessary steps to protect non-
combatants facing danger of pending violence in deployment zones of its “infantry 
battalions”, the mission failed to defend non-combatants in Bukavu when a mainly uneven 
group of between 1000 to 1500 armed aggressive rebel movements commanded by General 
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Laurent Nkunda invaded the city in June 2004 without being effectively challenged by 
MONUC or the Congolese. They entered Bukavu in a sham that the Banyamulenge (their 
ethnic kin) were facing massacre, and blockaded the city, burnt down the main market, 
robbed, raped and caused over 2000 non-combatants to seek refuge in the UN mission’s 
compound (Marks, 2005: 74). 
 
Another let-down of the mission’s peacekeepers was the failure of its peacekeepers to 
entirely disarm the rebel movements. According to a report by Amnesty International (2005) 
“Interahamwe (extreme Hutu militia) based in eastern Congo were responsible for hundreds 
of summary executions, rapes, beatings and civilian hostage taking in the territory 
of  Walungu, South Kivu Province” (Amnesty International, 2005). The Rwandan backed 
Rally for Congolese Democracy-Goma (RCD-Goma); a primarily Tutsi-led armed group 
retaliated causing gross human right violations and crimes against humankind in eastern 
DRC’s Kivu region. Its combatants refused to assimilate into the DRC army and conflicted 
with other DRC army militaries in South Kivu (Gordon, 2008: 1376). 
 
Towards the end of 2007, Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of Congo (FARDC) 
plans against General Nkunda with logistical backing from MONUC were a total let-down. In 
the following year, on 4 November, Nkunda’s armed rebel forces killed approximately 150 
non-combatants in the town of Kiwanja, a couple of kilometers away from where MONUC 
troops were based (Koko, 2011: 35). This created intense aggression and civil strife that 
caused more than 200 000 internally displaced persons (IDPs) until the beginning of 2009. As 
a result, MONUC’s ability to implement its mandate became questionable. Furthermore, the 
UN mission did not prevent terrible states of human rights violations, both in parts that were 
controlled by rebel forces and those controlled by the DRC government. Therefore, killings, 
random detentions and sexual assaults continued, although at a decreasing rate (Ogunrotifa, 
2012: 290). 
 
According to Terrie (2009: 22) MONUC’s challenges were both particular to the mission 
itself and indicative of UN missions challenges and constraints, comprising poor 
administration, doctrinal misunderstanding and an over-stretched force functioning with 
inadequate personnel. Nevertheless, MONUC progressed and rose to the challenging 
condition on the ground, but progress was mostly made as a consequence of measures instead 
of their expectation. Therefore, Congolese suffered the most as progress ordinarily followed a 
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violent conflict. Furthermore, the biggest problem for MONUC was to successfully utilize 
available force for the protection of non-combatants, its troops, the broader peace process and 
sometimes regional stability.  
 
The greatest problem for MONUC was dealing with external rebel forces, particularly the 
Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR). The FDLR’s continued presence in 
the DRC had a hand in General Nkunda’s resistance to leave the DRC, as he claimed to be 
acting in protection of Congolese Tutsi’s. As a result, MONUC had to adjust its operations in 
order to maintain pressure on the FDLR. However, the use of Mobile Operating Bases 
(MOB) was the most noteworthy development that saw MONUC troops leaving their camps 
and establishing presence in areas that were known to have been previously controlled by the 
FDLR (Terrie, 2009: 25).  
 
This approach destabilized the FDLR, but it was mostly dedicated to civilian protection while 
the DRC army implemented operations against the FDLR. Nevertheless, this had inadequate 
results because of the weakness of DRC forces. While MONUC chose to permit the 
Congolese government and its army to take charge in handling General Nkunda and FDLR 
issues, the DRC was short of an ability and political will to come up with resolutions. As a 
result, such frequently left the UN mission in a state where even though it was the only 
practical unified security force in eastern DRC, it had submitted to the idea of Congolese 
independence.  This frequently caused the mission to be accused of failing to safeguard those 
endangered by the rebel movements or the National Army (Terrie, 2009: 25).  
 
Also, in despite of developments in the mandate of civilian protection, MONUSCO remained 
stationary in its base in order to provide sufficient protection. Numerous instances have 
shown that the MONUSCO either learns of an attack too late or does not respond in time 
when it gets information on ending the violence (Lezhnev and Wimmer, 2012: 1). For 
instance, for four days between late July and early August 2010 over 20 women were raped 
in Luvungi and its surrounding areas, 30 kilometres within the perimeter of the mission’s 
peacekeepers camp. The inadequacy and inefficiency of the mandate of the UN peacekeepers 
to protect civilians also resurfaced in North Kivu around the same time, where about 500 
women and children were sufferers of rape and sexual abuses. Therefore, MONUSCO failed 




Again on 1 and 2 January, 2012, the FDLR slaughtered 39 non-combatants in the Shabunda 
villages of Luyuyu and Ngolombe, and caused displacements to Nzovu. This occurred 
following the closure of a MOB by MONUSCO troops that were stationed in Shabunda. 
However, the UN mission only sent its troops to Luyuyu two days after the attack and 
established a Temporary Operation Base (TOB) to protect IDPs, but it was too late to halt the 
massacre (Lezhnev and Wimmer, 2012: 1). The mission did not stop assassinations of non-
combatants by organized and in some instances government backed armed units. Its 
peacekeepers failed to intercept directed non-combatant attacks by members of the Armed 
Forces of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (FARDC), FDLR and their partners. In 
some instances these took the form of political killings. In others, rape and torture were 
basics for further extensive killings. The Human Rights Watch logged some thousand deaths 
since 2009, all caused by aggressive units who answered to a chain of command and 
demonstrated a systematized order. In the case of the FDLR, officers operated on behalf of 
the political conspiracies of fugitive leaders in Europe. Whilst in the case of FARDC, units 
revealed a substantial degree of sovereignty which implied incapacity of political leaders, 
including President Joseph Kabila, to utilize federal power over state militias from Kinshasa. 
Even more surprising was the fact that the mission’s peacekeepers trained and backed 
FARDC units who afterwards contributed to, or allowed, non-combatant killings (Copeland, 
2012: 60). 
 
Despite the UN presence, the conflict in eastern DRC continued. In April 2012, there was a 
new rebellion, the March 23 Movement (M23) (Lamont and Skeppstrom, 2013: 6). A month 
later, 37 people were murdered during an FDLR attack in South Kivu’s Kamananga village. 
The mission’s base was no more than 2 kilometres away, and troops could apparently hear 
firing; however a contingent only deployed to the village the following day. This significantly 
angered the local population who were frustrated by the peacekeepers incapacity to stop the 
killings. As a result, while Raia Mutomboki troops fired at the UN mission’s local base, non-
combatants flung stones and during the process 11 UN peacekeepers were reported to have 
been severely injured (Lezhnev and Wimmer, 2012: 1). According to Mr. Herve Ladsous, 
Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations, the biggest challenge MONUSCO 
faced in 2012 was the M23. Since April, after the military group instigated some of the worst 
sufferings ever witnessed in the eastern parts of the DRC, peacekeepers took robust strides to 
safeguard non-combatants. After the fall of Goma in November, peacekeepers evacuated lots 
of activists, state representatives and journalists against the M23 and where lives were in 
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danger. The crisis reignited regional political efforts and led to the signing of the Peace, 
Security and Cooperation Framework, and approval of the Force Intervention Brigade (FIB) 
by the Security Council in March 2013, on special terms. Through the FIB, the Security 
Council approved offensive operations to neutralize and disarm armed groups (UNPO, 2012: 
2) 
 
According to (Koko, 2011) the UN is responsible for MONUC’s shortcomings, as it was not 
intended to do an exceptional job in the DRC in the first place. The conceptualization of 
MONUSCO failed to deliberate on the intricacy of the conflict, the magnitude of the county 
and the needs on the ground. The UN had also previously deployed MONUC despite 
Kabila’s refusal to accept its deployment (Janik, 2014: 155). The very same happened again 
in 2009, when Joseph Kabila’s government demanded the withdrawal of MONUC  before it 
had even completed its mandate (as alluded to in chapter 2) (Amidala, no-date: 126). 
However, the UN risked becoming party to the conflict when instead of withdrawing its 
troops it replaced MONUC with MONUSCO. Therefore, through the change of mandate it 
was drawn more towards enforcement action and further from its fundamental role of 
peacekeeping. 
 
Koko (2011: 36) argues that the main parties to the conflict, including the DRC government, 
Uganda, Rwanda and factions of the Rally for Congolese Democracy (RDC) and the 
Movement for the Liberation of Congo (MLC) are also responsible for MONUC’s 
weaknesses (Koko, 2011). In line with Koko’s argument, Ahere (2012) states that the main 
parties were directly implicated in nearly all stages of the country’s peace process and played 
critical roles that were either helpful or destructive. A lot of them had strong preferences with 
regards to the aftermath of the transitional arrangements (Ahere, 2012: 3). Therefore, the 
complexity of the DRC conflict is constituted by this large number of conflicting parties. 
Bamidele (no-date: 130) notes that “at various levels, peacekeepers were faced with 
approximately 20 armed rebel factions, many of which had unprofessional armed forces, 
comprised of little more than militias and criminals who rarely respected the laws of war or 
did not consistently follow chains of command” Over and above that, some rebel groups had 
members who depended on conflict to make a living,  who therefore had vested interests in 





These parties continuously disregarded the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement despite having 
willingly signed it and even assigned MONUC for its implementation. The DRC did not 
implement security sector reform (SSR) due to fear of losing the dividends that came with 
then current state of affairs. Instead, they did not neutralize their troops, increased their 
numbers and sometimes misappropriated funds allocated to related activities. As far as 
Rwanda and Uganda are concerned, their tendency to disregard MONUC dates back to its 
deployment. For instance, months after the mission’s observers were deployed to the DRC; 
Rwandan and Ugandan armed forces fought for the control of Kisangani and continued to 
abuse MONUC’s weakness to back soldiers in Ituri (Koko, 2011: 36-37). 
 
Furthermore, the responsibility for MONUC’s shortcomings lies with the mission itself. 
Probably as a result of the laxity displayed by major powers with regard to its performance as 
well as the lack of sustained commitment to peace by Congolese parties. First and foremost, 
MONUC’s leadership did not display the necessary operational urgency that should have 
been required for an emergency situation such as that of the DRC (Koko, 2011: 37). For 
instance, MONUC was established in 1999, but its deployment was delayed till mid 2001 
because of Kabila’s intransigence and partly because the UN did not foresee the lack of 
progress on the ground. Similarly, the 3 000 reinforcements that were authorized for 
MONUC in November 2008 took over a year to arrive in the DRC (Bamidele, no-date: 124). 
By the same token, MONUSCO has also not only failed to protect the civilian population 
from gross human rights abuses, but committed serious errors itself, as operations conducted 
by FARDC along with MONUSCO often led to large numbers of civilian casualties (Janik, 
2014: 164). 
 
Again, during the course of MONUC deployment the mission showed low levels of 
reliability, efficiency and proficiency. As a result, MONUC continuously failed to implement 
UNSC resolution 1856 of 22 December, 2008, which tasked the mission to guarantee the 
safety of non-combatants and humanitarian personnel facing imminent danger of physical 
violence, particularly violence stemming from one of the parties to the DRC conflict (Koko, 
2011: 37). This was partly due to insufficient troops on the field to ensure that UN 
peacekeepers effectively provide protection. For example, although a UN report of March 
1999 estimated a need of more than 100 000 troops, fewer than 6 000 were granted (Roessler 
and Prendergast, 2006: 259). Therefore, despite the authorized numbers, actual deployment 
was considerably slower, delayed by sporadic conflict between the state and the rebels. For 
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example, the February 2000 authorization had permitted the deployment of 5 537 military 
personnel, but MONUC never achieved its authorized strength and, hence, by December 
2000, only 224 military personnel had been deployed (Bernath and Edgerton, 2003: 6).  
 
In October 2004, UNSC resolution 1565 granted MONUC only 5 900 of the 13 100 
additional troops requested and denied the mission a contingent intended for the south-eastern 
DRC (Roessler and Prendergast, 2006: 256). Again in 2006, the European Union (EU) armed 
operation in the DRC was deployed temporarily to the region in support of MONUC because 
the UNSC declined the then UN Secretary-General’s request that MONUC be given an extra 
2, 590 troops to deal with safety contingencies throughout the polls (Bamidele, no-date: 124). 
Protection of civilians has also been challenged by the misconduct of peacekeepers as they 
were also directly involved in illegal doings ranging from rape, to illicit trade of natural 
resources and even arms and ammunition (Koko, 2011: 37). For instance, at the end of 2004, 
in his report to the Security Council the then Secretary General Kofi Annan indicated that 
“between June and September 2004, an Office of Internal Oversight Services investigation 
into sexual misconduct in Bunia revealed that 8 of some 72 allegations could be 
corroborated”. The report also showed that most of the accusations included “soliciting the 
services of prostitute” (Dagne, 2011: 11). Also, according to the investigation, sexual 
exploitation and abuse of locals was a regular occurrence that MONUC had turned a blind 
eye on (Bamidele, no-date: 125).  
 
MONUC has also been challenged by its unclear mandate, which has at times given 
peacekeepers contradictory instructions. For instance, MONUC was authorized to back 
President Joseph Kabila’s regime and defend Congolese non-combatants, yet government 
soldiers were accountable for a substantial amount of the offenses committed against 
Congolese non-combatants. Therefore, this resulted in MONUC having to withdraw its 
support from key elements of the Congolese Army after it had been established that they 
were responsible for a large number of atrocities committed against civilians (Bamidele, no-
date: 126). According to a report by Amnesty International (2003: 7) MONUC had been a 
“hostage to its weak mandate and therefore its record in promoting the security of the civilian 
population has been little short of disgraceful”. Its mandate was challenged by Chapter VII of 
the UN Charter, as it technically grants protection for civilians but in the vaguest sense. 
Therefore, “acting under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, the Security Council also decided 
that MONUC may take the necessary action, in the areas of deployment of its infantry 
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battalions and as it deems it within its capabilities, to protect UN and co-located Joint 
Military Commission (JMC) personnel, facilities, installations and equipment, ensure the 
security and freedom of movement of its personnel, and protect civilians under eminent threat 
of violence” (MONUC mandate). 
 
However, “a dramatic test of the mandate was the May 14, 2002 crackdown and killings by 
soldiers of the RCD-Goma, in Kisangani. Where there were about 1 200 MONUC military 
personnel in Kisangani (approximately 650 Moroccans and 550 Uruguayans), but there was 
no military response from MONUC to the attack, nor did they offer protection to civilians 
who came to them” (Bernath and Edgerton, 2003: 2). Thereafter, when giving reasons for 
their failure to act, MONUC personnel stated that “neither the Moroccans nor the Uruguayans 
were infantry units and therefore its leaders did not deem it within their capacity to protect 
those civilians, even though they were certainly under eminent threat of physical violence” 
(Bernath and Edgerton, 2003: 2). 
 
These challenges and constraints have rendered both MONUSCO and SADC peacekeeping 
in the DRC a complete failure. The DRC continues to be mired in intractable conflict and till 
to date peace is still elusive. However, although there is relative calm in the western part of 
the country, the eastern region consistently experiences high insecurity and repeated 
incidences of violence. The reason why the DRC conflict has been continuous is because 
both the UN and SADC are confronted with a situation they do not fully comprehend. The 
latter’s challenges and constraints are a result of its historical factors, whilst the formers are a 














DISCUSSION OF FINDINGS 
 
This chapter will provide a comprehensive study of the role of MONUSCO and SADC in 
conflict resolution in the DRC. The analysis of MONUSCO and SADC in the DRC will also 
give insight into peacekeeping partnerships between local and international bodies and the 
challenges and constraints they endure in conflict ridden areas. 
 
4.1 SADC and conflict resolution in the DRC 
During the two phases of severe armed conflict that characterize the DRC, conflict resolution 
initiatives can be located in two phases. Phase one is traced back to the outbreak of the 
Second Congo War on 2 August, 1998, up until the signing of the Lusaka peace accord in 
July the following year. SADC and late President Muammar Gaddafi of Libya were the key 
role players throughout this stage (Mpangala, 2004: 18-19). During this stage, conflict 
resolution initiatives commenced with numerous SADC summits and meetings. The first was 
a summit of SADC Presidents and Presidents from Rwanda and Uganda, held in Victoria 
Falls, Zambia, on 7 and 8 August 1998. The second was a meeting of defense ministers that 
took place in Harare, Zimbabwe. It was called by President Robert Mugabe, under his office 
as chair of the SADC Organ on Inter-State Defence and Security Committee (ISDSC), and it 
resolved that President Laurent Kabila should be assisted by any SADC member state that 
was able to do so, hence the intervention by Zimbabwe, Angola and Namibia  (Mpangala, 
2004: 19).  
 
Essuman-Johnson (2009: 141) notes that these numerous summits and meetings ended in the 
signing of the Lusaka peace accord. According to Essuman-Johnson there were two parts to 
the agreement, the military and the political. The former explains step-by-step the terms of a 
ceasefire, establishing a Joint Military Commission (JMC) that involves belligerent parties. 
Also, there was the issue of the deployment of MONUC under Chapter VII of the UN 
Charter, the demilitarization of armed forces and the removal of external forces. The latter 
part of the agreement comprised the holding of the Inter-Congolese Dialogue (ICD) and the 
reinstatement of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the state. While the latter was 
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fundamentally national in nature, the former also encompassed foreign actors with troops in 
the DRC (Essuman-Johnson, 2009: 141). 
 
The second phase of conflict resolution initiatives comprised the period following the signing 
of the Lusaka peace accord. The accord tried to speak to both national and foreign concerns 
and acknowledged serious issues and the interdependence of a number of programmes. 
However, it did not create way for sustainable resolutions to the DRC conflict. Its weakness 
was a result of implementation being left in the hands of warring parties, and therefore 
opening space for the disruption of the process (Mpangala, 2004: 19). In line with 
Mpangala’s claim, Solomon and Swart (2004) note that conflict resolution initiatives began 
with signatories of the Ceasefire Agreement being tasked with the responsibility to ensure the 
proper implementation of the agreement. They also had to agree to do their level best to 
facilitate the ICD, since it was a step towards a new political system in the DRC (Solomon 
and Swart (2004: 8-9).  
 
Other initiatives taken during the second stage of conflict resolution comprised the 
installation of former President Masire of Botswana as mediator in the DRC conflict, by what 
was then known as the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) (now African Union (AU)). 
However, he encountered some difficulties as he was rejected by some parties, including 
Laurent Kabila. The Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement was reaffirmed in February 2001. The 
agreement was ushered in to deliberate on the concerns of warring factions, namely the DRC 
government, rebel groups, the Mai Mai, the Army for the Liberation of Rwanda (ALiR), 
Rwanda, Burundi and Uganda (Mpangala, 2004: 19-20). According to Yabadi (2011: 1) 
following his ascendance to the presidency, Joseph Kabila committed himself to the 
supervision of the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement. Therefore, by 2003 he had concluded the 
ceasefire in the DRC and established a transitional government that ultimately resulted in the 
coordination of the 2006 free and fair elections (Yabadi, 2011:1).  
 
In a quest to resolve conflict in the DRC, the SADC Heads of State and Government 
advocated for a pacific and sustainable resolution of the conflict, and vowed to provide troops 
to be deployed for that reason (Ngwawi, 2013: 7). Furthermore, SADC tried to make a 
significant contribution to fighting violence in the country and identified a need to set up 
institutional structures that would take part in vigorous strategies to peacebuilding and 
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reconstruction in the country. As a result, the organization set up a shared peacebuilding 
office with the AU in the Kinshasa (Gwanyayi et al, 2010: 2). 
 
At the SADC Summit held in Lusaka, Zambia, from 16 to 17 August 2007, the SADC 
Brigade was launched. A regional multidimensional peace support operations capability 
established under the African Standby Force Policy Framework. The Brigade initiated via a 
Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) signed by SADC leaders on the second day of the 
Summit, to guarantee preconditions for development such as peace, security and political 
stability (Madakufamba, 2007: 1). At a similar Summit held in Maputo, Mozambique, from 
17 to 18 August 2012, it was decided that SADC sends an intervention force to the eastern 
part of the DRC. The force was deployed to DRC in order to aid the government in 
demilitarizing all armed groups in eastern DRC, mainly the March 23 Movement (M23) 
rebels (Malebang, 2014: 159).  
 
Four months later, at the Extra-Ordinary Summit of SADC Heads of States and Government 
held in Dar es Salaam, United Republic of Tanzania, it was resolved that the SADC Standby 
Force be sent to the eastern DRC as a group under the supervision of the Neutral International 
Force (NIF). South Africa and Tanzania both vowed to contribute one battalion and logistical 
assistance to the NIF (Extraordinary Summit of SADC Heads of State and Government 
Communique, 2012: 2-3). Furthermore, to show further commitment to ending the DRC 
conflict, by the end of 2013, all SADC member states had interchangeably contributed troops 
to the Force Intervention Brigade (FIB). This was done in substitute of the three initial troop 
contributing member states, namely Malawi, Tanzania and South Africa, when their turn had 
ended and until the fulfilment of the mission goal (Malebang, 2014: 296).  
 
SADC has also been greatly assisted by its wealthiest member, South Africa. South Africa 
has played a prominent role as intermediate, organizer and supporter of the country’s peace 
processes (Dzinesa and Laker, 2010: 22-23) Its earliest contribution in the country was when 
it attempted to broker a peace agreement between Mobutu’s regime and that of Laurent 
Kabila (Kibasomba, 2002: 11). Still on the mission of peace, then “Foreign Minister 
Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma was sent to Kigali, Kampala and Kisangani with an aim to 
persuade the rebel forces to join the negotiations for peace. Hence, on 1st of August 1999, 
Jean-Pierre Bemba (Movement for the Liberation of Congo (MLC) leader) became the first 
Congolese rebel to sign the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement” (Kibasomba, 2002: 12). 
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South Africa’s assistance to the DRC was on technical aspects as well. Therefore, after the 
signing of the Agreement, “the South African Air Force (SAAF) was sent to the DRC, 
supported by the field hospital and military field engineers” (Kibasomba, 2002: 12). “The 
South African government was also able to persuade the foreign military personnel to 
withdraw their presence in the DRC. It was able to convince the participants in the DRC 
conflict to accept the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement. Hence, it was on 31 August 1999, on 
behalf of the Rally for Congolese Democracy (RCD) that the DRC government agreed on 
stopping the fighting” (Kibasomba, 2002: 11). South Africa was also a main actor in the DRC 
peace process, when a Global All-Inclusive Peace accord was signed in Pretoria, South 
Africa, on December 17 and endorsed in Sun City on 2 April, 2003. The peace accord 
requested “an end to the conflict, an ICD, withdrawal of foreign military personnel and the 
disarmament of rebels” (Hendricks and Lucey, 2013: 2). South Africa became even more 
involved in the peace process in 2002, when the ICD resumed in Sun City, South Africa, 
from 25 February to 12 April 2002. It became “a constant diplomatic presence” and chief 
negotiator in the DRC peace process, following its initial reluctance to get involved in the 
DRC crisis (Monyae, 2014: 123-124).  
 
Monyae (2014: 124) claims that reluctance was due to mere fact that following its failed 
intervention in Lesotho, South Africa did not want to be drawn into another military 
intervention. As well as Nelson Mandela’s standpoint on the issue of conflict resolution in the 
DRC (refer to chapter 3). Furthermore, South Africa’s reluctance was informed by the fact 
that it had limited peacekeeping capabilities and experience (Kibasomba, 2002: 6). 
Nevertheless, Hendricks and Lucey (2013: 2) assert that South Africa has been an essential 
donor to UN peace missions, particularly MONUC and MONUSCO. It contributed around 1, 
250 peacekeepers towards MONUSCO’s 20 519 strength. It also contributed 850 soldiers to 
the FIB, alongside the other two initial SADC troop contributors mentioned earlier. In line 
with Hendricks and Lucey’s assertion, Dzinesa and Laker (2010: 22) state that South Africa 
contributed 1, 268 troops to the UN mission, and fiscal, human and logistical backing to the 
country’s first democratic polls (Dzinesa and Laker, 2010: 22). 
 
The South African National Defense Force (SANDF) engineers worked with the mission’s 
peacekeepers in the country to keep the airport in the eastern city of Goma operating to make 
sure that significant armed and non-combatant provisions were able to be flown in. The 
SANDF contingent was deployed under the command of MONUSCO. This followed seizure 
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of the airport by fighters of the M23 rebel group, when they sidestepped the national army 
and the mission’s peacekeepers and marched into Goma (Szabo, 2012). South Africa 
continues to play a significant role in post-conflict rebuilding efforts in the DRC via the 
South Africa-DRC Bi-National Commission (BNC) that was initially organized in Kinshasa 
in August, 2004. Since then, South African companies participate in the DRC’s economy. 
(Dzinesa and Laker, 2010: 7). According to Hendricks and Lucey (2013: 3), .South Africa 
broadly clustered its assistance to the DRC into three key areas, namely, security sector 
reform (SSR), institutional capacity building and economic development (Hendricks and 
Lucey, 2013: 3).  
 
4.2 MONUSCO and conflict resolution in the DRC 
Ever since the outbreak of the conflict MONUC contributed actively to the cessation of 
hostilities and the preservation of peace and security. Established on 6 August, 1999, after the 
signing of the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement, its primary mission was to observe the peace 
process. Thereafter, taking into consideration the political modification in the country, 
MONUC had experienced numerous changes (Yabadi, 2011: 2). In 2004 the UN Security 
Council (UNSC) extended the mandate and role of MONUC by Resolution 1565 with more 
emphases on protecting the citizens, overseeing and taking control of arms embargo and 
disarming the rebels and foreign combatants (Khan, 2012:332). Therefore, MONUC had to 
withdraw all foreign groups from the DRC territory under the DDR process. The rationale 
behind this task was to create an environment that encouraged civilians and their relatives to 
take a step towards an improved life without arms. Therefore, in a quest to fulfill its 
responsibilities MONUC created a temporary reception center where combatants could hand 
in their weapons. But, the mission faced difficulties when dealing with the armed groups 
operating in eastern DRC. The difficulties were caused by the fact that those groups were not 
signatories to the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreements, meaning that they were not ready to 
surrender and reintegrate (Yabadi, 2011: 8-9). 
 
Nevertheless, through the use of force, MONUC managed to protect many civilians who 
were threatened by armed groups or even elements of their own army. For instance, in Ituri 
District, approximately 18 000 militias handed in their weapons and joined the disarmament, 
demobilization and reintegration (DDR) process, following forceful actions by MONUC 
(Cammaert, no-date: 104). The mission also peacefully repatriated close to 12, 000 foreign 
civilians and their dependents willingly to Uganda, Burundi and Rwanda, and over 1 million 
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internally displaced persons (IDPs) returned to their homes, predominantly in parts where the 
UN mission’s peacekeepers were present. (UNPO, 2004: 11). 
 
Subsequently, the mandate was further enlarged by Resolution 1797 which authorized 
MONUC to assist with organizing, preparing and conducting local polls. The mission’s role 
was then not only to control violence but also to uphold peace and assist the country to 
progress socially, economically and politically (Khan, 2012: 332). Therefore, in preparation 
for the 2006 elections, MONUC provided valuable assistance to the DRC’s Independent 
Electoral Commission (CEI) in the successful organization of the presidential, parliamentary 
and provincial elections. Through its Electoral Division, MONUC provided logistical and 
technical support to the CEI, ensuring that the latter was able to manage a very complex and 
tension-filled electoral process relatively smoothly (Koko, 2011: 35). MONUC’s important 
task was to guarantee enforcement of peace accords, facilitation of political transitional 
processes and to guarantee credible elections, with an aim to restore and maintain political 
stability in the DRC. Thus, the mission’s accomplishment in this regard was best 
demonstrated by the successful first democratic elections, with a voter turnout valued at 25 
million voters in the countries 53, 000 voting stations (Ogunrotifa, 2012: 918). Which 
according to Malan and Boshoff cited in Ogunrotifa (2012: 918) was “one of the major 
achievements of MONUC”.  
 
According to an Institute for Security Studies (ISS) situation report by Boshoff and Yav 
(2006), although the overall impression from observation teams was that the polls were 
nonviolent, transparent, credible and well administered. The same cannot be said about the 
election of 30 July 2006 which was carried out with incidents of violence and logistical 
problems (Boshoff and Yav, 2006: 1). For instance, in the Kasai province’s two towns of 
Mbuji-Mayi and Mweka, ballot papers were damaged when polling stations were burnt down. 
As a result, polls were postponed for the following day, in 172 polling stations in Mbuji-Mayi 
and 54 in Mweka, “where voting took place in a disciplined way” (Schroder, 2006: 13). The 
compilation process went much faster and smoother than throughout the initial round, 
particularly in Kinshasa, where the UN mission had taken over the logistics from the CEI (de 
Goede, 2006: 2).  
 
Not even one of the contenders received an outright majority, President Joseph Kabila and his 
vice Jean-Pierre Bemba received 44 percent and 20 percent, respectively. As a result, rerun 
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was scheduled for 29 October 2006 (de Goede, 2006: 1).  A couple of days following the 
declaration of the election outcomes, heavy clashed erupted between Bemba’s armed forces 
and Kabila’s Presidential Guard. This was a sign that there were great tensions and the build-
up to the rerun would be tense and potentially violent (de Goede, 2006: 1). The rerun 
campaigns by the two candidates and their alliances were fierce and at times aggressive. 
However, according to domestic and foreign observers, the polls were administered in a free 
and fair manner. Both voters and the electoral personnel were extra confident than they were 
throughout the first round (de Goede, 2006: 1). Polling took place in a generally peaceful 
environment, despite fears that that the elections would be mired by violence, following the 
tense election campaign (EISA, 2007: 54). An exception was the unfortunate rain in Kinshasa 
and other areas of the DRC which caused problems in the administration of the polling 
process, but did not drastically interrupt the elections (de Goede, 2006: 1). 
 
On 15 November, 2006, the CEI announced Kabila as the winner of the election with 58.05 
percent against Bemba who received 41.95 percent (Mangu and Budeli, no-date: 7). 
Subsequently, Bemba appealed the results to the Supreme Court of Justice (SCJ) claiming 
huge irregularities and vote rigging. But, the outcomes were already endorsed by the SCJ in 
its judgement delivered on 27 November 2006, exactly 10 days after they were announced by 
the CEI. Therefore, the transitional administration was concluded as President Kabila was 
inaugurated and took office on December 6, 2006 (Mangu and Budeli, no-date: 7). The 
elections and installation of a legitimate government made way for the post transition phase 
which led to the DRC into becoming an independent state. This meant that it was now the 
state’s main duty to defend its non-combatants. Therefore, MONUC’s role from then onward 
was mainly restricted to supporting the FARDC (Reynaert, 2011: 17).   
 
With regards to Congolese SSR, MONUC played a central role in disarming and 
demobilizing former combatants, including Ituri district militias, while working closely with 
other international players as well as the Congolese administration in the creation of a new 
and integrated national army. MONUC also played a significant role in the brassage process 
that formed twelve assimilated military contingents in the country from 2004 up until 2007. It 
was similarly influential during the modification of the National Congolese Police Forces 
(PNC) comprising the refurbishing of police training centres through the DRC (Koko, 2011: 
33). MONUC contributed directly to the training of 10, 000 DRC police officers in an array 
of specializations, comprising police instructors, anti-riot units and flying squads. The 
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mission also worked in partnership with the European Union (EU) in the process of ‘physical 
identification’ of members of the Congolese army for salary disbursement purposes. The 
mission has since been directly involved in the payment of salaries to soldiers in the hope of 
rooting out corruption and the embezzlement of soldiers salaries by the authorities (Koko, 
2011: 33-34). 
 
“MONUC launched important steps in 2009 to improve the protection of civilians. It 
increased the number of field bases, placing peacekeepers throughout North and South Kivu 
in locations where they were better able to provide civilian protection. In a further effort to 
overcome some of the challenges and bridge the divide between MONUC peacekeepers and 
the civilian population, MONUC also established Joint Protection Teams (JPT) in early 
2009” (Swart, no-date: 53). Resolution 1925 of May 2010 then renamed MONUC to 
MONUSCO in order to emphasize that the peace process had taken a significant step 
forward. Its mandate was also more confined, namely upholding the importance to protect 
civilians and contribute to the consolidation of the situation by inter alia supporting the 
police-reform or the organization of elections (Janik, 2014: 158-159). 
 
A year later, on 28 November, the DRC held multi-party elections for the second time since 
decolonization in 1960. Therefore, “in accordance with its mandate, MONUSCO provided 
technical and logistical support to the DRC’s CEI for the conduct of the presidential and 
legislative elections” (UNPO, 2011: 24). MONUSCO made transport arrangements for about 
3, 000 tons of electoral materials and over 400 electoral observers that needed to be 
transported around the country, in support of the electoral process (UNPO, 2011: 24). 
Furthermore, in conjunction with the UN Development Programme (UNDP), the mission 
provided technical assistance to CEI, including with regard to the voter registration process. 
They also supported the production, coordination and distribution of materials that were 
designed to intensify public awareness of the presidential and legislative elections and 
promote civic education (UNPO, 2011: 24).  
 
Although the organization of the elections was welcomed by the Congolese population, the 
actual elections took place under unfavorable political conditions, which inevitably 
undermined their democratic value. The integrity of the electoral process was compromised 
from the outset by undemocratic tendencies, which were reveled in, among other political 
actions, the quasi-unilateral amendment of the Constitution to undo the two-round system of 
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voting for the presidential election, the marginalization of civil society from electoral 
administrative processes, and the censoring of private media outlets (IGD, 2012: 3). The 
interplay of these structural irregularities produced an electoral process that lacked 
transparency, did not enjoy the trust of electoral actors, and was pervaded with diverse 
elements of contestation. Furthermore, the electoral commission lacked the capacity and will 
to mitigate the concerns of political parties and other electoral stakeholders over irregularities 
in some aspects of the process, such as the compilation of the voters’ roll or the setting up of 
polling stations. Just like in the preparatory phase of the process, voting and the compilation 
of results were also subjected to the same degree of irregularity, lack of transparency and 
distrust (IGD, 2012: 3-4). 
 
According to the Human Rights Watch (2013) the worst polling connected was in Kinshasa, 
where roughly 57 opposition party followers or alleged followers were murdered by security 
forces, mostly Kabila’s Republican Guard from 26 November up until 31 December. 
Approximately 150 additional people were murdered in the same period, with their corpses 
allegedly discarded into the Congo River, in mass graves on the borders of Kinshasa, or in 
mortuaries away from the city centre. Others who were accused of differing with Kabila were 
randomly imprisoned by Republican Guard Soldiers and the police. Whilst many were 
detained in illicit detention centres where they were abused and some even murdered (HRW, 
2013: 2). 
 
Furthermore, “Abuse against opposition supporters also occurred in other areas, including 
North and South Kivu, Katanga, and the Kasai provinces. In some areas, soldiers and militia 
members backing Kabila used intimidation and force to compel voters to vote for certain 
candidates” (HRW, 2013: 2). According to the Carter Center observation cited in Schoppert 
(2013) there were various indiscretions such as voter inflation in parts known to be loyal to 
Kabila and voter suspension in parts known to be loyal to the opposition. For instance, in 
some former parts, voter attendance was 99 to 100 percent, which was somewhat impossible 
considering that only a few roads were paved and every vote was for Kabila (Schoppert, 
2013: 77). Nevertheless, “President Joseph Kabila was declared winner of the 28 November 
2011 elections, which both national and international election observers criticized as lacking 




The security situation in eastern DRC got worse between 2011 and 2012. It became 
increasingly clear that, although the UN had invested heavily into the stabilization of the 
DRC, it had pretty little to show for it (Dehez, 2014: 3). Therefore, “MONUSCO stepped up 
its efforts and intensified its support to Congolese forces and multiplied patrols to better 
protect civilians. On the political front, the UN sought to support ongoing regional diplomatic 
efforts” (UNPO, 2012: 14). Also, to implement the mandate tasks of civilian protection and 
providing support to the DRC government with its stabilization and peace consolidation 
effects, MONUSCO provided meaningful assistance to the Armed Forces of the Democratic 
Republic of Congo (FARDC) between 15 and 20 November, 2012. The mission’s assistance 
comprised 18 attack helicopter operations against M23 bases and direct fighting with its 
soldiers, in a quest to prevent the rebel movement from capturing Goma. However, following 
FARDC’s withdrawal from its bases in protection of Goma, the mission’s forces chose not to 
participate in direct fighting with the M23 to prevent possible civilian deaths in the heavily 
populated environment (MONUSCO, 2013: 14).  
 
Furthermore, Furthermore, the mission forces, nonetheless continued to protect Goma airport 
as well as other strategic areas. Its forces also upheld a strong presence in the town of Goma, 
comprising approximately 80 daily patrols as well as the formation of 17 Quick Reaction 
Forces for civilian defence and the prevention of human rights abuses and looting throughout 
the M23 capture of Goma. Additionally, during the period between 15 and 26 November, the 
mission evacuated 160 people considered to be in danger because of the existence of the M23 
in Goma. Amongst those evacuated were the Governor and his vice, other government 
officials, magistrates, police journalists and human rights defenders. The mission also 
ensured the safety and protection of more than 3000 locals (MONUSCO, 2013: 14). 
 
“The crisis reignited regional political efforts and led to the signing of the Peace, Security and 
Cooperation Framework, as well as the authorization of the FIB by the Security Council in 
March 2013, on an exceptional basis. Through the FIB, the Council authorized offensive 
operations to neutralize and disarm armed groups” (UNPO, 2012: 2). The FIB was authorized 
within the framework of MONUSCO and composed of 3, 000 military personnel from South 
Africa, Tanzania and Malawi (Lamont and Skeppstrom, 2013: 10). According to an assertion 
made by the UN Secretariat, the FIB was not a peacekeeping mission but a peace 
enforcement mission. The “first-ever ‘offensive’ combat force,” authorized by the Security 
Council “on an exceptional basis and without creating precedent or any prejudice to the 
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agreed principles of peacekeeping” (cited in chapter one) (Sheeran and Case, 2014: 2). 
Therefore, according to an interview with Herve Ladsous, Under-Secretary-General (USG) 
for the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO), “the Intervention Brigade must 
be seen in the broader political context as a way of addressing those who attempt to spoil 
peace efforts” (UNPO, 2012: 3). 
 
In March of the following year, Security Council Resolution 2147 extended the FIB’s 
mandate within MONUSCO, and there were only minor meaningful amendments to the 
Brigade’s mandate (Sheeran and Case, 2014: 3). On 26 March 2015, the UNSC extended the 
mission’s mandate and the FIB by twelve months through resolution 2211 of 2015. UNSC 
members unanimous decided to decrease the mission’s personnel by 2000 soldiers, which 
was to be made permanent if and when there was any evidence of substantial progress on the 
mandates most important tasks. The UNSC mandated the mission to carry on maximizing 
force compatibility, flexibility and efficiency in implementing its mandate, and decided that 
the mission’s upcoming reconstruction and mandate should include the DRC government. It 
reiterated that civilian protection ought to be treated with urgency when making decisions on 
the use of available capacity and resources, and therefore mandated the mission to anything 
possible to guarantee the effective protection of non-combatants and UN personnel, facilities, 
installation and equipment. On the other hand, the UNSC authorized the FIB to implement 
targeted offensive operations in collaboration with MONUSCO and either separately nor 
cooperatively with DRC military personnel, within the ambit of international law (UN Press, 
2015).  
 
4.3 Local and international peacekeeping partnerships  
The end of the Cold War not only increased the need for peacekeeping missions, but it also 
altered their limits. However, the UN’s role as a key global peacekeeping player did not 
change, but it introduced a new style of regional peacekeeping. The new style reflects the 
localization of international relations depend on the mixed efforts of global and regional 
organizations to resolve post-Cold War conflicts (Baba and Slotter, 2014: 1). As a result, the 
bond between the UN and Africa organizations has undergone several transformations. The 
Security Council and the General Assembly have held open gatherings where they made 
announcements on collaborations between the UN and regional organizations during the last 
10 years. The 1992 Agenda for Peace report by Boutros Boutros-Ghali, the then UN 
Secretary General identified the need for greater cooperation. Therefore, two years later the 
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General Assembly passed a declaration on improving collaboration with “regional 
organizations” focusing on peacekeeping activities aligned to the Security Council’s 
endorsement of regional players. Parts identified for probable collaboration include the 
sharing of information and consultation, membership in UN bodies, and personnel and 
material aid (Holt and Shanahan, 2005: 51). 
 
A highlight of UN-SADC interaction in conflict transformation in the DRC was in the year 
2000 when SADC ambassadors at the UN mounted a diplomatic offensive and secured the 
involvement of the UNSC in facilitating a peaceful resolution to the DRC conflict. It is the 
intervention and stabilization role of SADC member states, Zimbabwe, Angola and Namibia 
in the DRC in 1998 that is in fact credited for making it possible for the later UN deployment 
of MONUC in the year 2000 (Malebang, 2014: 97). Ten years later, on 21 September, SADC 
and the UN signed a MoU. The MoU provided a framework between the two organizations, 
particularly aimed at strengthening cooperation in peace and security. Following which, the 
UN Department of Political Affairs (UNDPA) opened an office in Gaborone, Botswana, 
where the SADC Secretariat is based in order to fulfil aims of the framework (Malebang, 
2014: 97). 
 
Under the auspices of MONUSCO, SADC deployed the FIB comprising Malawi, South 
Africa and Tanzania, after they had met UN requirements and criteria for deployment in 
Peacekeeping Operations (PKOs) (SADC Media Release, 2014). Malebang (2014: 98) argues 
that the FIB is wholly owned by the UN in terms of funding and equipment, but led by SADC 
member states in terms of human resources. Through collaborative efforts by both 
organizations the FIB successfully managed to defeat the notorious M23 rebel group at the 
end of 2013 (Malebang, 2014: 98). However, “While the defeat of the M23 rebel group was a 
magnificent accomplishment, it has not resulted in sustained or increased security in the 
eastern Kivu region of the DRC. Armed groups such as the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) 
(Ugandan-led armed group) and the FDLR are still operating in the region” (ISS Today, 
2014). Therefore, rebel groups remain persistent threats to the country’s peace and security. 
 
UN-AU partnerships were evident during the Burundi conflict. During the deployment of the 
African Union Mission in Burundi (AMIB), the UN functioned in conjunction with the AU 
during the Burundi political process and offered MONUC resources. Therefore, when the AU 
could no longer sustain AMIB it negotiated with the UN to take over its leadership. Their 
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partnership assisted AMIB to move from being a regionally-led to being an internationally-
led mission (Holt and Shanahan, 2005: 41). According to Rodt (2011: 22) the move from 
AMIB to the UN Operation in Burundi (ONUB) was made possible through the deployment 
of AMIB troops, but under ONUB control. 2, 612 AMIB troops constituted the initial group 
that formed ONUB. The UN operation was meant to have a total of 5, 650 armed forces, 
comprising 200 armed observers, 120 police and close to 1, 000 domestic and global non-
combatant staff. But, the operation’s force generation process was hindered by members 
states delayed responses.  
 
Nevertheless, the change of operations went well, because from the initial stages of AMIB 
operation the UN and AU had close operations and they established a mutual understanding 
of the dynamics of the Burundian conflict. It was also because the mission’s deployment was 
founded on the agreement that the UN would ultimately accept its duty. The mission was 
ended in December 2006 following a fruitful conclusion of the mandate and substituted by 
the UN Integrated Office in Burundi (BINUB) that coordinated international aid. (Chaizy, 
2011: 10). There is also evidence of partnerships between the UN and the Economic 
Community of Western African States (ECOWAS), as well in Liberia. The UN backed the 
efforts of ECOWAS member states in Liberia. The UNSC started showing interest in Liberia 
on 22 January, 1991, when it commended the efforts ECOWAS presidents. A year later, on 7 
May, the Council also praised the ECOWAS Ceasefire Monitoring Group’s (ECOMOG) 
Yamoussoukro IV Accord, stating that it presented the finest imaginable framework for the 
pacific resolution of the Liberian conflict. Therefore, in support of the accord the Security 
Council imposed a universal and comprehensive restriction on all supplies of arms and 
military equipment to Liberia, excluding supplies that were exclusively for ECOMOG use 
(Onumajuru, 2005: 43). 
 
Subsequently, in September 1993, the UNSC established the UN Observer Mission in Liberia 
(UNOMIL) by its resolution 866. UNOMIL was launched to supervise and monitor 
ECOMOG’s execution of the Cotonou Peace Agreement. It was mandated to support 
ECOWAS and the Liberian National Transitional Government (LNTG) in implementing the 
Cotonou agreement, investigating ceasefire violations, assisting in the demobilization of 
combatants, and investigating human rights violations (Huangi, 2007: 85). Therefore, 
UNOMIL worked with ECOMOG in executing the agreement (Onumajuru, 2005: 43). The 
agreement outlined the distinct tasks for both ECOMOG and UNOMIL. The former was 
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accountable for the execution of the ceasefire and demilitarization, whilst the latter was given 
the role of observing the formers actions, comprising enforcement activities (Kihunah, 2005: 
125).  
 
Each mission was expected to conclude its own manner of operations in consultation with the 
other. ECOMOG was accountable for guaranteeing the security of UNOMIL observers and 
non-combatant staff. It was understood that if the mission got into conflict operations in a 
particular area, UNOMIL would provisionally pull out from that particular area. Also, if 
ECOMOG was forced into an unexpected self-defence armed action, it ensured the safety of 
UNOMIL observers and other UN personnel in the area (Kihunah, 2005: 125). However, the 
working relationship between UNOMIL and ECOMOG quickly deteriorated. The latter’s 
lack of resources implicated the effectiveness and morale of its troops who were variously 
unpaid or underpaid. This caused tension with UNOMIL staff whose mission was much 
better funded, but dependent on ECOMOG to function. ECOMOG’s lack of resources also 
led to numerous alleged occurrences of corruption, comprising the sale of fuel to the US and 
meant for ECOMOG automobiles; hence the local joke that the mission’s acronym stood for 
“Every Car or Moving Object Gone” (Tuck, 2000: 9). 
 
Tension amongst the two missions was on political direction, local command and personnel 
on the ground (Huangi, 2007: 85). ECOMOG resented that they required UNOMIL’s 
supervision because it implied some level of distrust in the mission’s abilities and intentions 
(Tuck, 2000: 10). It perceived the UN to be incapable of dealing with belligerents as it only 
came into the scene three years later (Kihunah, 2005: 126). ECOMOG was already deployed 
and it was the bigger formation, while UNOMIL was assigned under the Cotonou agreement 
with “supervising” execution, and that implied some form of direct role. Thus tension 
between leaders of the respective missions on which mission should take the lead (Tuck, 
2000: 9). 
 
As ECOMOG was larger in size than UNOMIL it eventually dictated its movements. For 
instance, it occasionally restricted UNOMIL observers at roadblocks and required them to 
monitor non-combatants evening curfews even though their early agreement was that they 
would be allowed to freely travel the whole of Liberia. This resulted in the UNOMIL being 
perceived by a lot of people as just being a political mechanism with not much applied 
purpose, except for the conciliation of the then Liberian President Charles Taylor (Kihunah, 
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2005: 126).  UNOMIL was simply there to support ECOWAS; UN monitors were completely 
dependent on ECOMOG for their own personal security and that of their mission as a whole. 
Therefore, as a monitoring and legitimating mission, this severely hampered UNOMIL’s 
independence and its ability to carry out its mandate, particularly the investigative tasks 
(Huangi, 2007: 86). 
 
As a result, there were enormous practical difficulties for both ECOMOG and UNOMIL. The 
coordination between the deployments of both missions was often very poor. For instance, 
UNOMIL observers were at times deployed into certain areas without the backing of 
ECOMOG, thus exposing them to compromising situations. For example, UNOMIL troops 
that were deployed into Lofa County and Northern Nimba were not protected by ECOMOG. 
Even when the two missions were deployed together, UNOMIL was at times subjected to 
numerous ECOMOG restrictions which undermined the mission’s integrity (Tuck, 2000: 10). 
Therefore, UNOMIL could not implement a lot of its authorized activities and was sometimes 
forced to remove its troops from Liberia. In November 1995, the Security Council cut down 
the mission’s presence to 160 personnel and edited its mandate, giving it a lower profile role 
in support of ECOMOG and the LNTG (Kihunah, 2005: 127). A year later the deteriorating 
conflict in Monrovia forced further removals which saw UNOMIL’s strength being reduced 
to less than 20 troops. As a result, the mission’s role was unclear and its existence 
insignificant, regardless of the renewal of its mandate. This became a constant circumstance 
till the security situation had developed sufficiently for the polls to take place in 1997, thus 














SUMMARY, CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
5.1 Summary: 
This chapter is divided into four sections: a section that highlights and summarizes the 
study’s point of departure; a section which offers possible solutions and transformation for 
conflict and policy initiatives; a section that concludes the entire study; and a section which 
offers recommendations. 
 
Overall, the study’s main point of departure is the role of peacekeeping bodies’ in Africa. It 
specifically analyzes the role of MONUSCO and SADC in the DRC conflict. Chapter one 
was an introduction to the study. It outlined the background, research questions and 
objectives of the study. It argued that the investigative and interpretive nature of this study, as 
well as its objectives of unpacking the role of MONUSCO and SADC in peacekeeping in the 
DRC required a qualitative research approach. The approach involved techniques of 
gathering information which are neither quantitative nor numerical, for example, books, 
journals, newspapers and internet sources. The study used data sourced from both primary 
and secondary sources in analyzing the role of MONUSCO and SADC in the DRC conflict. It 
utilizes content analysis as a method of analysing both primary and secondary documents for 
the research topic. The chapter concluded with the limitations as well as a description of the 
structure of the study.  
 
The second chapter sets the scene of the DRC conflict. Firstly, it examined the DRC’s socio-
economic and political conditions prior to the arrival of MONUSCO and SADC. It was 
discovered that the DRC plunged into deep political crisis and social instability just a few 
months after attaining independence. It had very limited human and institutional capacity for 
good governance and even for establishing a functional government. Therefore, weak 
governance left the DRC as one of Africa’s poorest and least developed countries, resulting 
in an overall extremely disappointing economic performance. The economic decline was 
accompanied by a deep deterioration of the DRC’s social sector. Secondly, it identified and 
explained factors that gave rise to the MONUSCO and SADC deployment in the DRC 
conflict. SADC’s deployment was a direct response to Kabila’s call for help after the 
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beginning of Africa’s First World War when Rwandans invaded the DRC and backed new 
rebellion forces against Kabila. MONUSCO was deployed amongst other things to 
implement and oversee the Lusaka accord following its signing. 
 
The third chapter evaluated challenges and constraints of MONUSCO and SADC in 
peacekeeping in the DRC. It accentuated the factors that hindered the success of 
peacekeeping operations in the DRC conflict. The chapter notes that SADC’s challenges and 
constraints are a result of its historical factors, whilst MONUSCO’s are a result of its 
ignorance about the DRC, its region and the nature of its conflict. Finally, the fourth chapter 
discussed the findings. Firstly, it provided an analysis of MONUSCO and SADC in conflict 
resolution in the DRC. The latter called for a peaceful and durable resolution of the conflict 
through collective means, whilst the former actively contributed to the cessation of hostilities 
and the maintenance of peace and security. Secondly, it provided insights into peacekeeping 
partnerships between local and international bodies’ as well as the challenges and constraints 
they endure in conflict ridden areas. The chapter notes that partnerships between local and 
international peacekeeping bodies’ are vital for the success of peacekeeping operations and 
combating African conflicts. 
 
5.2 Solutions/ transformation for conflict and policy initiatives: 
Drawing from the challenges and constraints in chapter three and four, this study makes the 
following solutions/ transformations for conflict and policy initiative: 
 
5.2.1 Integration and co-operation between SADC member states 
SADC member states must unite behind one shared vision and develop a clear policy with 
regards to its preferred type of intervention. Therefore, it needs to deal with issues of fiscal 
and logistical weakness as well as the absence of political consensus between its commanders 
on shared security norms and practices. 
 
5.2.2 Pursuit of regional interests  
Regional interests must be prioritized over those of individual states because the DRC crisis 
affects the entire region and not just the DRC or particular states. Therefore, all intervening 





5.2.3 Mandates must be clearer  
Mandates must give peacekeepers clear instructions to avoid giving them contradictory 
instruction as alluded to in Chapter 3. 
 
5.2.4 Provision of sufficient well-trained peacekeeping troops 
The number of UN peacekeepers must be increased to ensure they fulfill the mandate of 
protecting civilians, with well-trained peacekeepers. Therefore, troop contributing states 
should consider the intricacy of the DRC conflict, its magnitude and requirements on the 
ground when contribute their troops to UN missions.  
 
5.2.5 The integration of rebel groups 
All rebel movements need to be dismantled and assimilated into the national armed forces in 
order for the Congolese government to establish its authority throughout the country and so 
that the conflict is not as complex and intractable. However, members of rebel groups 
suspected of human rights violations should be excluded in order to strengthen the protection 
of civilians in the DRC.  
 
5.2.6 Proactive responses 
Peacekeeping forces must not be reactive but proactive so as to avoid certain incidents before 
they take place. This would assist in avoiding the unnecessary killings of innocent civilians 
and the general perpetuation of the DRC conflict as alluded to in Chapter 3. 
 
5.3 Conclusion: 
This research study’s aim was to discover why the DRC conflict remains continuous despite 
the presence of MONUSCO and SADC, amongst other peacekeeping bodies’. To achieve this 
goal, the study examined the role of peacekeeping bodies’ in Africa. In particular, it 
examined the role of MONUSCO and SADC in conflict resolution and peacekeeping in the 
DRC conflict. It examined their successes and failures as per their mandates and 
responsibilities towards combating conflict in the DRC. The examination of both 
peacekeeping bodies’ highlighted new insights into peacekeeping partnerships between local 
and international peacekeeping bodies’ and the challenges and constraints they endure in 




The DRC political crisis and subsequent continuous violent conflict is by no means a result of 
inactiveness to resolve the conflict by the international community. As matter of fact, the UN 
has been committed to the DRC’s peace process for almost 20 years. It has facilitated the 
negotiation and signing of numerous peace agreements, and has also deployed thousands of 
troops. However, these numerous agreements and thousands of troops have so far not ended 
conflict in the DRC (Diercks, 2011: 1). SADC’s failure to ceasefire and bring stability to the 
country is a result of a split in the organizations intervention approaches to the conflict. The 
Zimbabwean-led military intervention in support of the Kabila regime was de facto, as it was 
neither supported nor rejected by SADC. Whilst the South African-led pacific negotiated 
settlements also did not receive any broad-based backing from SADC (van Schalkwyk, 2005: 
37). 
 
UN missions have also been playing a significant role in the DRC, where international 
intervention through peacekeeping operations is trying to discover a sustainable resolution of 
the DRC conflict. For instance, the missions’ mandates as well as contributions by 
peacekeeping troops were expected not only to end conflict in the DRC, but also to try and 
transform the conflict into peace, particularly for the Congolese. However, the UN missions 
have proven to be generally incapable of managing the DRC conflict due to the intricacy of 
the DRC conflict, its magnitude and requirements on the ground. As supposed impartial 
missions, MONUC and MONUSCO forces were unable to access critical information about 
the ongoing DRC conflict. Even though MONUC expended to become the biggest and most 
costly UN mission ever in the history of UN peacekeeping, the mission was not as equally 
effective (Diercks, 2011: 31). 
 
Yet again, while democratic elections can be a beacon of hope, this was not the case in the 
DRC. Kabila’s revisions of the electoral process depicted that his interests are self-centered 
and not people-centered, that he is more concerned with his personal interests then seeking 
good governance for the DRC. Furthermore, not much has been done by his regime to find 
lasting solutions to the primary causes of conflict in eastern DRC (Diercks, 2011: 38-39). 
 
This study has sought to show that the role of both SADC and MONUSCO in peacekeeping 
in the DRC has not been fully explored since there is still conflict in the eastern DRC. 
However, the main reason for failure of the peacekeeping strategy is the fact that the SADC 
has been divided in their response, whilst the international community has not given enough 
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attention to the primary causes of conflict in the DRC. Nevertheless, it is also equally clear 
that without their intervention the situation in the DRC would in all likelihood have been 
much worse than what it is today. 
 
5.4 Recommendation: 
Drawing from the findings of the study as well as matters arising from the final remarks, this 
paper makes the following recommendations that comprise proposals for further research on 
the topic of peacekeeping in Africa: 
 
5.4.1 Recommendations based on the Findings 
The crisis in the DRC illustrates the historical patterns alluded to in Chapter 2 as the root of 
the current conflict. Therefore, “as long as the Congolese government cannot control its 
territory, provide basic services or effectively protect its population, and as long as diverse 
armed groups are able to prosper from illicit trade in natural resources and complex regional 
alliances, eastern Congo will remain a battlefield and innocent civilians will continue to pay a 
tragically high cost” (Ngendahimana, 2014: 50). Therefore, the Congolese government and 
its people should play a key role in the resolution of its own conflict and for the country to 
achieve democracy and the respect of human rights. Government should be strong enough to 
provide security to its civilians without relying on peacekeepers. However, its conflict 
solutions must involve other parties as strategic coordination is crucial since the DRC conflict 
involves a variety of actors. Therefore, a distinct specialization can be observed between 
those actors that provide troops, those that contribute financial resources and those that 
decide about the mandate. 
 
All parties involved must have political will and be committed to the resolution of the DRC 
conflict. They must be readily willing to “invest the necessary resources to achieve specific 
objectives and a willingness to make and implement policy despite opposition” (Little, 2010: 
3). So as to ensure that ultimately there is peace and security in the DRC. Lezhnev and 
Bafilemba (2005: 4) argue that “in order to build democratic legitimacy in the DRC after 
years of war and transition, it is crucial to have a free and fair transfer of power”. Therefore, 
democratic elections must be considered the most viable solution to the DRC conflict. Both 
the 2006 and 2011 elections ushered in an elected government, but the elections were not 
democratic. Therefore, in as much as elections are viewed as part and parcel of conflict 
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resolution measures, they can equally deepen existing splits if they are undemocratic, as it 
appears to have been the case in the DRC.  
 
During the post-Cold War era the International structure is faced with more intra and less 
inter-state conflicts. Therefore, there is an evident shift of roles by international organizations 
in regional conflicts. The shift has resulted in changes in the nature of conflict, from being 
conflict of ideas to being conflict of ethnic and religious orientation. African regional 
organizations have played their part in solving regional conflicts, although they have not yet 
succeeded in many conflicts. However, all hope is not lost, as regional organizations have 
their share in the development of African states. Therefore, if used effectively, regional 
organizations have the potential to resolve the DRC conflict (Ngendahimana, 2014: 48).  
 
Most of the actors in the DRC conflict are either rebel groups from neighbouring states or 
supported by them. Therefore, the resolution of the DRC conflict requires the full 
participation of regional actors. Moreover, the very nature of the conflict calls for a regional 
response. The primary causes of the DRC conflict comprise economic competition over 
natural resources, the struggle for identity and survival by ethnic groups, and the oppression 
legacy of rebellious civil movements, which are rooted in the African culture. Therefore, it 
would be virtually impossible for international forces to comprehend the complexity of the 
culture and the struggle for social identity. Hence, “practical solutions to the problems with 
consideration to local needs and situation can be better provided by regional leaders, thus, 
regional mechanisms to conflict resolution in the DRC can be fruitful” (Ngendahimana, 
2014: 85). 
 
However, in order to resolve the current conflict there must be peacekeeping partnerships 
between local and international actors. Therefore, the UN and SADC need to make clear as 
well as develop their operational doctrines and not allow differences and divisions to hinder 
their conflict resolution initiatives in order to help facilitate more lasting peace and security. 
For instance, SADC will need to develop the ability to observe, assess and guarantee the 
execution of agreements that it helps to negotiate, “and the international community must 
support the implementation of agreements with long-term commitments” (Lezhnev and 
Bafilemba, 2013: 4). Therefore, the victory of peace treaties is entirely dependent upon the 




Peace and security in eastern DRC can only be achieved if and when the DRC government 
keeps to its commitments and responds to the country’s internal issues (Lezhnev and 
Bafilemba, 2013: 4). Equally, both its neighbour states and the international community 
should play their parts in the DRC peace process. The former must start by withdrawing their 
troops from the DRC and seize backing any of the rebel groups currently involved in the 
DRC conflict. Whilst the latter needs to back the execution of peace treaties with lasting 
commitments and also involve the DRC government and regional organizations in their 
endeavours pertaining conflict in the DRC. 
 
5.4.2 Recommendations for Further/ Future Research 
As noted in chapter 1, the desktop qualitative method selected by the researcher was exposed 
to several methodological limitations due to resource constraints. It is therefore recommended 
that scholars with an interest in furthering this field of research should cover a more 
comprehensive scope through field research because it is a necessity for any recent conflicts 
on which not much research has been done on. Future studies could also employ more data 
collection instruments such as interviews, focus group discussions and observations in order 
to generate more comprehensive findings. However, this does not mean that the desktop 
qualitative method is completely written off as it is relevant for future peacekeeping studies 
in popular conflicts on which a bulk of literature has already been published. Finally, future 
research could assess the role played by the Congolese government in the country’s peace 
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